Hernandez v. Amidron Energy, LLC
- Edward Davila
- 5:21-cv-01011
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 20
In Hernandez v. Amidron Energy, Judge Davila granted defendants’ summary-judgment motion, denied Hernandez’s motion, and dismissed his state claim without prejudice.
Gerardo Hernandez and defendants Amidron Energy, LLC, HMR Associates 1 LLC, 7-Eleven, Inc., and AIT Venture Inc.; the court’s ruling granted defendants summary judgment on the ADA requests and dismissed Hernandez’s Unruh Act claim without prejudice.
What happened
In Hernandez v. Amidron Energy, LLC, Gerardo Hernandez alleged that a gas station’s raised platform denied him access under the Americans with Disabilities Act and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act. He sought changes including employee training, signs, and product information for customers with disabilities.
The court rejected defendants’ arguments that Hernandez lacked standing, finding that actual knowledge of the barrier was enough and that evidence showed a dispute about whether he was deterred from returning. But it ruled that the requested ADA remedies were moot because the station already had trained employees, signs, and pump call buttons for requesting assistance. The court also declined supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and dismissed it without prejudice.
Judge Edward J. Davila granted defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, denied Hernandez’s motion for summary judgment, and ordered the file closed.
The detailed version
- Hernandez v. Amidron Energy, LLC · No. 5:21-cv-01011
- Edward Davila
- Dec. 4, 2023
Background
Gerardo Hernandez, who uses a wheelchair, sued Amidron Energy, LLC doing business as 76 #37993, HMR Associates 1 LLC, 7-Eleven, Inc., and AIT Venture Inc. He alleged that conditions at the gas station violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act.
The cashier booth and some products were on a platform with a curb measuring between 5 and 6.75 inches. Hernandez visited the station on December 12, 2020, but his mother paid for the gas. The parties disputed whether Hernandez saw the platform during that visit and whether his mother went to the booth because he knew he could not approach it. The opinion states that Hernandez later gained actual knowledge of the platform.
Hernandez conceded that removing the architectural barrier was not readily achievable. He instead sought alternative accommodations: visible signs telling customers with disabilities how to request help, a way for employees to provide information about products for sale, and employee training on assisting with payments, fueling, and product purchases. He also sought $4,000 in statutory damages under the Unruh Act.
Standing
Defendants argued that Hernandez lacked Article III standing because he did not personally encounter the platform or attempt to use the cashier booth. The court denied the cross-motion on that ground. It held that, under Ninth Circuit precedent, a plaintiff need only have actual knowledge of a disability-related barrier that affected the plaintiff; personal physical contact with the barrier was not required. The court found it undisputed that Hernandez eventually had actual knowledge of the barrier, even though the timing of that knowledge was disputed.
Defendants also argued that Hernandez lacked standing to seek an injunction because he had not shown an intention to return or a specific occasion when the barrier deterred him. The court denied the cross-motion on this ground as well. Hernandez’s statement that he was currently deterred from visiting the station and would return if it became accessible created a genuine dispute of material fact. Because deterrence could establish the required future injury, the court did not address whether he also intended to return despite the barrier.
Mootness of the ADA Requests
A claim for injunctive relief may become moot when later events make it clear that the challenged conduct could not reasonably be expected to recur. The court found that the station already had the accommodations Hernandez requested before he filed suit and that those accommodations remained in place.
Training. Evidence showed that employees were trained to assist customers with disabilities by pumping gas, retrieving products, and leaving the kiosk to facilitate payment. The court found that this training substantially matched Hernandez’s requested training. It rejected his arguments concerning employee discretion and the frequency of training because those arguments did not dispute that the employees were trained in the requested ways. The court ruled that the training request was moot.
Signage and assistance requests. The station had two signs stating that assistance was available, and each pump had a call button displaying the International Symbol of Accessibility and instructing customers to press the button for assistance. Although Hernandez argued that the signs were not visible from every pump and did not explain how to obtain assistance, the court held that the call buttons supplied that information at each pump.
Hernandez also disputed whether the buttons worked on the date of his visit. The court found that he had not provided evidence establishing that they were inoperable then. The investigator’s later test of three buttons did not show that the buttons were not working on the date of Hernandez’s visit. The court ruled that the signage request was moot.
Product information. The court found that employees were trained to help customers obtain information about products and that customers could request assistance through the call buttons or by otherwise getting an employee’s attention. The court held that this existing system provided access to product information even though the station did not provide a printed product list or photographs. The product-information request was therefore moot.
Based on these findings, the court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that Hernandez’s ADA claims seeking training, signage, and product information were moot.
Unruh Act Claim
Defendants asked the court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Hernandez’s Unruh Act claim. Supplemental jurisdiction is a federal court’s authority to hear a related state-law claim alongside a federal claim. The court found exceptional circumstances supporting declination, including the concerns identified by Ninth Circuit decisions about high-frequency ADA litigants bringing Unruh Act claims in federal court and potentially avoiding California’s additional procedural requirements.
The court concluded that fairness, respect for California’s role in applying its own law, judicial economy, and convenience all favored declining jurisdiction. It therefore declined supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and dismissed that claim without prejudice.
Disposition
Because the court found the ADA requests moot and declined jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim, no claims remained before it. Judge Edward J. Davila granted defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, denied Hernandez’s motion for summary judgment, dismissed the remaining Unruh Act claim without prejudice, and ordered the clerk to close the file.
Read the full 20-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.