Susana L. v. Commissioner of Social Security

Background

Susana L. applied for Supplemental Security Income benefits, alleging disability beginning April 7, 2016. An administrative law judge initially found her not disabled, and the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council declined review. Susana L. then appealed to the district court.

On March 28, 2022, the court granted Susana L.’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for further administrative proceedings. On remand, an administrative law judge found that Susana L. was disabled and entitled to past-due disability benefits. The Social Security Administration awarded $42,717.56.

Susana L.’s attorney, Nancy K. McCombs, moved for an award of attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). The fee agreement allowed counsel to request up to 25% of any past-due benefits. McCombs requested $10,679.39, equal to 25% of the benefits award. The request included a refund to Susana L. of the $5,400 previously awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

Legal standard

Section 406(b) allows an attorney who successfully represents a Social Security claimant in federal court to seek fees of up to 25% of past-due benefits. The court must independently review the fee agreement and determine whether the requested amount is reasonable. Relevant considerations include the quality of the representation, the results achieved, whether counsel delayed the case, and whether the fee would be an improper windfall. A fee awarded under section 406(b) must be offset by any Equal Access to Justice Act fee award through a refund to the claimant.

Court’s analysis

The court found the requested fee reasonable. It did not exceed the 25% statutory maximum, and counsel’s reported 27.8 hours of work appeared reasonable. The requested fee produced an effective hourly rate of $384.15.

The court explained that the usual lodestar method—calculating fees primarily from hours worked multiplied by an hourly rate—should assist, but not control, the review of a contingent-fee award under section 406(b). Courts may defer to reasonable contingency-fee agreements because they compensate attorneys for the risk of representing Social Security claimants. The court also noted that comparable or higher fees had been approved in other California district court cases.

Nothing in the record suggested that McCombs provided substandard representation. She obtained a substantial past-due benefits award, and no party objected to the request. The court therefore concluded that the fee was not excessively large in relation to the benefits achieved.

Disposition

The court granted the motion for attorneys’ fees and awarded McCombs $10,679.39. McCombs was ordered to refund Susana L. the $5,400 previously awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act.