McArthur v. Alameda County Public Defender's Office

Background

The order followed a pretrial conference in Francis McArthur's case against the Office of the Alameda County Public Defender, Diane Bellas, Brendon Woods, Robert Shipway, Youseef Elias, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors, and the County of Alameda. McArthur filed nine motions in limine, which are requests to decide before trial whether particular evidence may be presented. The defendants filed seven.

McArthur alleges that his public defenders violated his due-process right to a timely trial during proceedings under California's Sexually Violent Predator Act. The court explained that the timeliness issue would be evaluated under the four-factor test from Barker v. Wingo: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, whether McArthur asserted his right, and prejudice. The court had also previously separated, or bifurcated, the issue of potential Monell liability concerning customs and practices from the issues being tried at this stage.

McArthur's Motions

1. Michael J. Aye's expert testimony — DENIED. The court allowed defendants' expert to testify. It rejected McArthur's argument that Aye would improperly offer the ultimate legal conclusion about whether a constitutional violation occurred. The court found that testimony about whether the public defenders' strategy was reasonable could assist the jury in evaluating the Barker factors, without deciding the constitutional question itself. The court also found that McArthur's reliability objections generally concerned the weight of Aye's opinions rather than admissibility.

2. Generalizations about sexually violent predator clients — ruling DEFERRED. McArthur sought to exclude generalizations about other patients or clients, including whether they wanted to come to court or consciously delayed their trials. The court found the motion too unclear to decide what evidence it covered and deferred ruling until the issue arose.

3. Prior crimes and bad acts — DENIED. The court allowed evidence concerning the specified alleged conduct and prior events. It found the evidence prejudicial but highly probative of whether the public defenders reasonably viewed delay as a strategy, how evaluators might respond to the information, and whether McArthur agreed with the advice. The court stated that it would consider a proposed limiting instruction explaining how the jury could use the evidence.

4. Evidence that delay was common practice — DENIED. The court found that evidence that the strategy was used throughout California could bear on the professional norms at the time and whether the strategy was reasonable. The ruling did not allow evidence solely concerning whether the Alameda County Public Defender's Office had a custom of encouraging delay, because that issue had been separated from the current trial.

5. Continuances after conflict counsel was appointed — DENIED. The court found evidence of continuances relevant to whether delay was a reasonable strategy. It rejected McArthur's argument that the evidence would improperly make his counsel a witness because McArthur provided no supporting legal authority or analysis.

6. Evidence produced by Coalinga that was not in defendants' file — DENIED. The court found the motion unclear and inadequately supported. Defendants stated that they understood they would need to establish the evidence's foundation.

7. Evidence designed to create sympathy for McArthur's public defenders — DENIED. The court found the motion insufficiently specific and accepted defendants' explanation that such evidence could rebut McArthur's claim that the public defenders disregarded his needs and requests and could relate to disputed mail.

8. Testimony about facts witnesses did not remember — DENIED. The court found the motion premature and unclear, but stated that McArthur could still object at trial based on a witness's lack of knowledge.

9. Evidence that McArthur was found competent to stand trial in criminal cases — DENIED. The court found the evidence potentially relevant to McArthur's cognitive abilities and noted that the motion lacked supporting legal authority and analysis.

Defendants' Motions

1. Custom, pattern, and practice evidence — DENIED. The court found the motion insufficiently specific. It noted that the parties had agreed not to present evidence concerning supervisory liability and that the court had bifurcated Monell liability. The ruling did not bar evidence about a statewide strategy or strategies frequently used by individual public defenders.

2. References to other civil lawsuits — DENIED. The court found the motion unclear and noted the parties' agreement concerning certain documents, testimony, and arguments about decisions in other cases. The ruling did not prevent objections to specific irrelevant evidence about other lawsuits.

3. Habeas decisions in other sexually violent predator cases — DENIED. The court found it unclear what evidence and expert opinions the motion covered and declined to decide the issue based on speculation about its scope.

4. Subsequent remedial measures — GRANTED. The court granted the motion to exclude evidence concerning the addition of a supervisor in the sexually violent predator unit or other later remedial measures when offered to show liability. McArthur did not oppose the motion and stated that he did not seek to introduce the evidence for that purpose.

5. Rudy Kraft's expert testimony — GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The court excluded Kraft's testimony about whether McArthur's public defenders violated his due-process rights, the applicable professional standard of care and whether the defenders met it, whether they ensured that Coalinga properly accommodated McArthur's intellectual disabilities, whether workload caused a breakdown in the public defender's office, whether failure to obtain a guardian ad litem showed that the defenders misunderstood their obligations, and customs and practices. The court otherwise allowed opinions based on the motions filed and related legal authority to the extent they were admissible.

The court concluded that Kraft had not shown that he was qualified to identify the professional standard of care in a sexually violent predator case. It also found portions of his opinions unreliable because they relied on incomplete records, assumptions, or speculation. The order separately stated that Kraft could not testify about the ultimate legal question of whether the public defenders violated due process.

6. Evidence relating to ineffective assistance of counsel — DENIED. The court rejected defendants' request to exclude all such evidence. Although McArthur did not bring an ineffective-assistance claim, the court found that evidence about the public defenders' actions could also be relevant to the due-process inquiry, including the reasons for delay and whether McArthur asserted his right to a timely trial.

7. Evidence concerning other sexually violent predator cases — GRANTED. McArthur did not oppose this motion, so the court granted it.

Other Rulings and Disposition

The court ruled on identified objections to defendants' exhibits, including evaluations, public-defender correspondence and notes, the complaint, and a response to a public-records request. The order states that the objections were sustained or overruled as specified in the tentative rulings and the modifications made at the hearing. The court also gave directions concerning juror questionnaires, the verdict form, jury instructions, trial time limits, exhibits, and courtroom technology. Judge Kandis Westmore ordered the parties to follow those pretrial procedures and entered the listed dispositions on the motions in limine.