Henry v. Contra Costa Department of Child Support Services

Background

Ronald Henry, representing himself, alleged that he owed more than $90,000 in child support for his son, who turned 18 on June 11, 2008. Henry challenged Contra Costa Department of Child Support Services’ enforcement of the child-support obligation, including the suspension of his driver’s license and a levy on his bank account. He argued that 42 U.S.C. § 666(e) did not authorize enforcement after his son became an adult.

Henry sought an injunction against enforcement under that statute, declaratory judgments concerning the department’s authority and the California Constitution, $15 million in compensatory and punitive damages, and a refund of money he said had been taken illegally. The court had granted him permission to proceed without paying the filing fee and reviewed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which requires dismissal of a self-represented plaintiff’s case if it fails to state a claim for relief.

Motion to Recuse

Henry asked Judge Corley to disqualify herself under 28 U.S.C. § 455. He objected to proceeding before a district judge rather than a magistrate judge and argued that Judge Corley had shown bias in an earlier related proceeding by describing his theory as “novel and defies common sense.”

The court denied the recusal motion. It explained that no consent was required because Judge Corley was serving as an Article III district judge. It also found that Henry had identified no financial or personal interest or other facts showing bias from an outside source. The court held that disagreement with a judge’s legal ruling was not enough to require recusal and that the earlier statement reflected analysis of Henry’s argument rather than evidence of bias.

Failure to State a Claim

The court identified four reasons the complaint failed to state a claim:

1. No private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 666. The court held that § 666(e), which defines “overdue support,” does not create a private right of action. The court also concluded that § 666 as a whole does not expressly create such a right or show congressional intent to allow individuals to sue under it. The statute instead directs states and their agencies to use prescribed procedures for child-support enforcement as a condition of receiving federal funding.

2. Enforcement was within statutory authority. The court read § 666(e) as allowing collection of overdue support owed to or on behalf of a child who is not a minor child. It also concluded that California law allowed the enforcement actions. Under the cited California statutes, a child-support order continues in effect, arrearages may be recovered after the child turns 18, and a driver’s license may be suspended or money may be withheld from a bank account for overdue support.

3. Constitutional claims failed. The court construed the complaint as asserting Fourth Amendment and federal and California due-process claims. It concluded that suspending Henry’s driver’s license to enforce a valid child-support order was reasonable in light of the state’s interest in collecting child support. It also held that collecting overdue support was rationally related to a legitimate government purpose and that Henry had not plausibly alleged that the department exceeded its authority. The court rejected his California privileges-and-immunities claim because the license suspension was not unreasonable or arbitrary, and it rejected the California due-process claims for the same reasons as the federal due-process claims.

4. The Administrative Procedure Act did not apply. To the extent Henry asserted claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, the court dismissed them because that statute applies to federal agencies, while the defendant was Contra Costa Department of Child Support Services.

Disposition and Leave to Amend

The court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. It allowed Henry to file an amended complaint by January 5, 2024, and stated that judgment would be entered against him if he did not file one by that date. The order denied the motion to recuse and disposed of Docket Nos. 1 and 13.