McArthur v. Alameda County Public Defender's Office

Background

Francis McArthur asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, alleging that the Alameda County Public Defender’s Office violated his Fourteenth Amendment due-process right by failing to bring his case to trial. The court’s order concerns proposed jury instructions for the trial. The opinion states that liability of the named defendants under the rule for municipal liability was being handled separately, and that the jury would consider whether the acts of McArthur’s deputy public defenders, rather than the named defendants, caused a constitutional deprivation.

Plaintiff’s proposed instructions

The court modified Plaintiff’s proposed Instruction 1.5, which summarized the parties’ positions. It removed the reference to a violation of an unspecified state statute because McArthur did not identify the statute or explain how it created a protected due-process interest. It also removed language stating that the defendants had the burden of proving that McArthur or others caused or contributed to the delay. The court held that McArthur, as the person asserting the due-process violation, had the burden of showing a violation under the four-factor test from Barker v. Wingo. The court allowed language stating that McArthur denied knowingly and intentionally waiving his right to trial.

The court modified the final sentence of Plaintiff’s proposed Instruction 9.2 to state that the jury would decide whether or not the acts of McArthur’s deputy public defenders, rather than the named defendants, caused a constitutional deprivation. It issued Plaintiff’s Instruction 9.3 concerning the § 1983 claim as proposed and issued Plaintiff’s Instruction 9.31 concerning the Fourteenth Amendment as proposed.

Defendants’ proposed instructions

The court issued Defendants’ Instruction 2.9 on impeachment evidence as proposed. It rejected McArthur’s proposed addition concerning a witness’s demonstrated bias because another instruction already addressed witness credibility, including bias or prejudice.

The court did not issue Defendants’ Instruction 1, based on Polk County v. Dodson. That instruction would have explained that a person must act under color of state law to be liable under § 1983 and that individual public defenders generally do not act under color of state law. The court concluded that the instruction could confuse the jury by conflating the public defenders’ lack of § 1983 liability with whether they were responsible for the alleged constitutional violation.

The court modified Defendants’ Instruction 2 on the due-process claim. The instruction would tell the jury to apply the Barker balancing test by considering the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, McArthur’s assertion of his right to trial, and prejudice caused by the delay. McArthur would bear the burden of proving a due-process violation. The court removed proposed language that placed particular emphasis on the duties of the prosecutor and trial court in Instruction 2, directing that those matters be addressed in the instruction concerning the reason for the delay. The court retained the requirement that the jury balance all four factors.

For Instruction 3, concerning the length of the delay, the court rejected McArthur’s argument that the factor should be omitted. It ordered the parties to meet and confer and jointly propose a modified instruction. If they did not do so, the court proposed language stating that whether the length of the delay supports a due-process violation depends on the specific circumstances of the case.

For Instruction 4, concerning the reasons for the delay, the court ordered the parties to meet and confer about modifications, including how to address the responsibilities of the prosecutor and trial court. The court rejected McArthur’s arguments that the instruction improperly treated responsibility for the delay as an affirmative defense and that the instruction should not be given because of the parties’ other arguments. The court also stated that the proposed language concerning delays sought by a defendant’s lawyer was supported by the cited authority.

The court modified Instruction 5 by replacing the phrase “Sexually Violent Predator’s assertion of the right to a timely trial” with “Plaintiff’s assertion of the right to a timely trial.” The court found the original wording unnecessary and possibly prejudicial because McArthur had not been found by a jury to be a sexually violent predator.

The court modified Instruction 6 concerning prejudice. It retained the conclusion that prejudice should not be presumed solely from the length of the delay in this type of proceeding, but removed an unnecessary comparison to criminal trials. The modified instruction would direct the jury to consider three interests protected by the speedy-trial right: preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing anxiety and concern, and limiting the possibility that the defense would be impaired. The court stated that prejudice remained a factor even though monetary damages were not at issue in the trial.

The court did not issue Defendants’ Instruction 7 on ineffective assistance of counsel. It agreed that the instruction was confusing, misleading, prejudicial, and irrelevant because McArthur was not asserting an ineffective-assistance claim. The court explained that evidence concerning the public defenders’ conduct could still be relevant to the reasons for the delay, McArthur’s assertion of his rights, or the reasonableness of the defense strategy, depending on the evidence.

The court modified Defendants’ Instruction 8 on the independence of the public defender. Because this case did not concern McArthur’s status as an indigent criminal defendant, the court changed the proposed reference to criminal defendants and sexually violent predators to state that the Constitution requires civil committees to receive effective and independent legal counsel. The court left in place the sentence stating that a public defender opposes the designated representatives of the state.

Disposition

The court issued modified versions of Instructions 1.5, 2, 5, 6, and 8; issued Instructions 9.3, 9.31, and 2.9; did not issue Instructions 1 and 7; and required the parties to meet and confer about Instructions 3 and 4. It ordered the parties to submit joint jury instructions by December 18, 2023, including copies in an editable Word format. The order did not decide the ultimate merits of McArthur’s due-process claim.