Clark v. Perez-Pantoja

Background

Clark Chester, a state prisoner, filed a complaint without a lawyer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against officials for violating constitutional rights. He sued Sgt. I. Perez-Pantoja over events at the Correctional Training Facility. The court previously found that the complaint stated potentially valid claims under the First and Eighth Amendments.

Chester alleged that Perez-Pantoja sexually assaulted him during a clothed body search on May 12, 2021; retaliated against him by searching and allegedly damaging his cell on May 22; and retaliated against him during an August 27 body-search incident by ordering another search, placing him in a holding cell after he refused, and issuing a false Rules Violation Report. The disciplinary hearing resulted in a finding that Chester was guilty and a loss of 61 days of credit.

Perez-Pantoja moved for summary judgment, arguing that the evidence defeated Chester’s claims, that Chester had not properly completed the prison grievance process for some claims, and that qualified immunity protected him. Chester did not file an opposition, but the court considered his verified complaint as evidence opposing the motion.

Eighth Amendment claim

The court granted summary judgment on the claim concerning the May 12 body search. It assumed, for purposes of the motion, that Chester’s account was true—that Perez-Pantoja briefly grabbed and squeezed his penis over Chester’s clothing. The court found no evidence that the contact was sexual, intended for sexual gratification, or intended to humiliate or degrade Chester. The search was conducted during movement to the recreation yard, where officers performed random clothed searches to detect contraband and weapons.

The court also emphasized that the search lasted only a few minutes, Perez-Pantoja made no sexual comments, the pain subsided after a few minutes, and Chester did not seek medical treatment. It concluded that the evidence showed, at most, a brief and minor use of force that did not cause an objectively serious harm or violate the Eighth Amendment.

First Amendment retaliation claims

The court granted summary judgment on the retaliation claim concerning the May 22 cell search. Chester alleged that Perez-Pantoja damaged his cell because Chester had filed a grievance about the May 12 search. The court found no evidence that Perez-Pantoja knew about the grievance when he searched the cell or that he was the person who damaged it. Chester acknowledged that he did not see anyone damage the cell and that his belief about Perez-Pantoja’s responsibility was based on assumptions. The court also ruled that Chester did not properly exhaust the prison grievance process: his appeal was untimely, and he did not appeal the rejection of that appeal.

The court also granted summary judgment on the claims arising from the August 27 incident. Assuming Perez-Pantoja made the statement Chester attributed to him—“You know I need to search you when I see you[,] Clark, you wrote me up!”—the court found that the statement could show a retaliatory motive. But it ruled that merely ordering a clothed body search was not sufficiently adverse to support retaliation, particularly because such searches occurred regularly and randomly. The court further found no evidence that the order chilled Chester’s exercise of his rights because he refused the search and later filed grievances.

As to the holding-cell placement, the court found that Chester had refused a direct order to submit to the search, Perez-Pantoja followed policy by handcuffing and escorting him to the holding cell, and Perez-Pantoja lacked authority to decide when Chester would be released or whether he could attend the recreation period. The court therefore found no genuine dispute of material fact on that retaliation claim.

Regarding the Rules Violation Report, the court noted that a damages claim challenging the report appeared barred by the rule from Heck v. Humphrey because success would call into question the uninvalidated loss of 61 days of credit. The court nevertheless also granted summary judgment on the merits. It found that Chester had refused Perez-Pantoja’s direct order, that this refusal delayed Perez-Pantoja’s duties and inmate movement, and that the report was therefore not shown to be fabricated. The court separately found that Chester had not properly exhausted his administrative remedies concerning the report because his grievance was filed approximately two months after the incident, rejected as untimely, and not further appealed.

Disposition

The court concluded that Perez-Pantoja had shown no genuine dispute of material fact on the claims. It granted Perez-Pantoja’s motion for summary judgment, dismissed the First and Eighth Amendment claims against him with prejudice, and terminated the motion. The court stated that it was unnecessary to decide qualified immunity because it found no constitutional violation.