Keo v. Marin County

Background

Chanht Reatrey Keo alleged that she owned property in San Rafael, California, that Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) acquired the property through a nonjudicial foreclosure, and that related court proceedings led to her eviction. In earlier proceedings, a judge dismissed Keo’s foreclosure case against Freddie Mac on claim-preclusion grounds, Freddie Mac won summary judgment in an unlawful-detainer case, and a court issued a writ of possession. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the results of both appeals.

Keo filed this lawsuit against San Rafael, Freddie Mac, Melissa Robbins Coutts, and other defendants. Her amended complaint asserted fourteen claims, including a request for relief from the earlier court orders, a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and California-law claims. The court had previously dismissed four other defendants because Keo did not serve them.

Rule 60 claim

Keo sought relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(1), which allows an independent action seeking relief from a judgment, order, or proceeding. The court explained that this remedy requires a meritorious claim or defense, diligence and lack of fault, no adequate alternative remedy, and a judgment that is “manifestly unconscionable.”

The court held that Keo did not meet this demanding standard. She had already challenged the earlier orders through two appeals and was attempting to relitigate those orders. The court also rejected her arguments that California’s claim-preclusion law was unconstitutionally vague and that eviction moratoria applied. The court granted both the Coutts motion and the San Rafael motion as to claim one.

Bivens claim

A Bivens claim is a damages claim based on certain constitutional violations by federal officials. The court held that such claims cannot be brought against private individuals, municipalities, or agencies. Freddie Mac and San Rafael were not federal officials, and Keo did not allege that Coutts was a federal official. The court granted the Coutts motion and the San Rafael motion as to claim three.

ADA claim

The court held that Keo had not pleaded enough facts to state an ADA claim. She did not identify her disability or explain how the alleged eviction and loss of personal property violated the ADA. The court found her allegations conclusory and granted both motions as to claim four.

State-law claims

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Keo’s remaining California-law claims. Supplemental jurisdiction is a court’s authority to hear related state-law claims in a federal case. The court concluded that considerations of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and respect for state courts favored declining jurisdiction. The court dismissed the state-law claims.

Amendment and service

The court determined that amendment would be futile. Keo had already amended her complaint, and the court had previously instructed her to state each claim clearly, identify each defendant, and describe each defendant’s specific actions. The court found that the amended complaint remained vague and conclusory, so it declined leave to amend.

The court separately dismissed Nicole Lopez because Keo had not filed proof that Lopez had been served. The court relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) and Keo’s repeated failures to serve other defendants despite reminders.

Disposition

The court granted the Coutts motion and the San Rafael motion in their entirety. It dismissed Keo’s claims against Coutts, Freddie Mac, and San Rafael without leave to amend, and dismissed Lopez from the action for failure to serve. The judge’s name is not fully legible in the provided opinion text.