Fayed v. Davis

Background

James Michael Fayed, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison, filed this self-represented civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His third amended complaint challenged deductions from his inmate trust account intended to satisfy restitution obligations. He alleged that some deductions occurred before the California Supreme Court resolved his direct appeal and that Warden Ron Davis and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation authorized additional deductions beyond those ordered by the Los Angeles Superior Court.

Fayed asserted claims under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, including due process and equal protection, as well as a state-law claim based on California Penal Code § 1243. He sought $350,000 from Los Angeles County and $150,000 from Davis. The order also addressed Fayed’s renewed request for appointment of counsel.

Screening Rulings

Under the prisoner-screening statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court had to identify claims that were legally sufficient and dismiss claims that were frivolous, malicious, failed to state a claim, or sought money from an immune defendant.

The court held that the third amended complaint stated a cognizable procedural due-process claim against Davis in his individual capacity. The court understood Fayed to allege that Davis authorized a deduction without providing a procedure to challenge it beforehand. The court ordered that claim to be served.

The court held that the complaint did not state a cognizable claim against Los Angeles County Superior Court or against Davis in his official capacity. It dismissed with prejudice all claims against Los Angeles County Superior Court, the request for compensatory damages against that court, and all claims against Davis in his official capacity. The court also dismissed with prejudice the Fourth Amendment claim, the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim, and the Eighth Amendment claim. It explained that prisoners do not have a Fourth Amendment right to be free from seizure or conversion of personal property, that the challenge to the authority for the deductions was more appropriately considered under due process, and that the alleged loss of prison canteen and food- or charity-drive privileges did not rise to an Eighth Amendment violation.

The court dismissed the state-law claim of deliberate indifference to clearly established state law with prejudice because it found no private right of action under California Penal Code § 1243. The court dismissed the equal-protection claim with leave to amend. It stated that Fayed had not alleged facts showing that Davis treated him differently from similarly situated people, but allowed Fayed to amend if he could truthfully allege that the additional deductions were taken only from his account and not from other inmates’ accounts.

Counsel and Case Management

The court denied Fayed’s renewed motion for appointment of counsel because his filings did not show changed circumstances or exceptional circumstances. The court directed that Warden Davis be served through the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s electronic-service program.

Fayed was given 28 days from the order’s date to file a fourth amended complaint addressing the equal-protection deficiencies. If he did not do so, the third amended complaint would remain operative and the case would proceed solely on the claims the court found cognizable and against the defendants ordered served. The court also set deadlines for Davis to file a summary-judgment or other dispositive motion and for the parties to respond, and authorized discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Disposition

The court denied the renewed motion for appointment of counsel. It found a cognizable procedural due-process claim against Davis, dismissed the equal-protection claim with leave to amend, and dismissed with prejudice the specified claims against Los Angeles County Superior Court, Davis in his official capacity, and the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment claims. Judge Jon S. Tigar’s order allowed the case to continue on the cognizable claim.