Nathanson v. Truebeck Construction, Inc.

Background

Matthew Nathanson filed a discrimination action in San Mateo County Superior Court against Truebeck Construction, Inc., and Does 1–50. Nathanson alleged that he worked for Truebeck as a Jobsite Safety Manager from May 11, 2020, until December 22, 2022, when he was constructively or wrongfully terminated.

Nathanson alleged that he injured his knee while working for Truebeck on January 21, 2021. After taking time off for treatment, he returned to work in February 2021. He later returned to perform light duty, but alleged that Truebeck said it had no light-duty positions, refused to let him return to work, and ignored his requests to return. He further alleged that his doctor cleared him to work in April 2022, but Truebeck still refused to allow him to return.

His complaint asserted four claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act: disability discrimination, failure to engage in an interactive process, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, and retaliation. He also asserted claims for constructive or wrongful termination in violation of public policy and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Removal and Motion to Remand

Truebeck removed the case to federal court. It argued that federal question jurisdiction existed because Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act completely preempted Nathanson’s claims. Truebeck asserted that Nathanson’s employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement and that resolving the claims would require interpreting that agreement.

Nathanson moved to remand the case to state court. He argued that his claims did not require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. The parties also disputed whether his motion was timely. The court explained that a motion based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be made at any time before final judgment, because subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.

Court’s Analysis

The court explained that Section 301 can completely preempt state-law claims when resolving those claims depends on the meaning of a collective bargaining agreement. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis asks first whether the asserted right comes from state law or solely from the collective bargaining agreement. If the right exists independently under state law, the court then asks whether the claim is substantially dependent on interpreting the agreement. A claim is not preempted merely because the agreement may be considered or cited as a defense; interpretation must be necessary to the nature of the plaintiff’s claim.

Truebeck did not dispute that the rights Nathanson asserted came from state law. The court therefore focused on whether his claims substantially depended on analyzing the collective bargaining agreement.

Truebeck cited provisions concerning discharge, discharge for cause, industrial injuries, and grievance procedures. The court found that Truebeck did not explain how those provisions applied to Nathanson’s claims or why the case required interpreting them. The court stated that Ninth Circuit precedent consistently holds that California Fair Employment and Housing Act discrimination claims do not require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, even when the agreement closely regulates the conduct alleged to be discriminatory. The claims turned on Truebeck’s motives rather than on contractual rights.

The court also concluded that Truebeck failed to show that removal of Nathanson’s wrongful-termination claim was proper. The complaint suggested that this claim was based on Nathanson’s Fair Employment and Housing Act claims and was independent of the collective bargaining agreement.

The court reached the same conclusion regarding the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. That claim arose from the same circumstances as the discrimination claims, and Truebeck did not specifically address it or carry its burden of showing that removal was proper. Because the underlying claims were not preempted, the court concluded that this claim was not preempted either.

Disposition

The court concluded that Section 301 did not preempt Nathanson’s claims and that removal was improper. It granted Nathanson’s motion to remand the matter to the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Mateo.