Torfason v. Bernal

Background

James Paul Andrew Torfason, a California prisoner proceeding without a lawyer, brought this civil-rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment had been granted. Summary judgment is a decision entered without a trial when the court concludes that the available evidence does not present a legally sufficient dispute requiring a trial.

Torfason then filed a motion under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure asking the court to alter or amend the judgment. The court explained that this type of motion generally requires newly discovered evidence, a change in the law, or a clear error by the court. Evidence available before the ruling is not newly discovered for this purpose.

Arguments and analysis

The opinion states that Torfason raised four arguments, but the provided text does not fully include the first argument. The court rejected the arguments described in the text.

First, regarding Torfason’s failure-to-protect claim, the court held that evidence of the other inmate’s possible gang affiliation would not by itself have made it obvious to a reasonable official that the inmate would assault Torfason. The court also noted that the jail’s policy treated sensitive-needs inmates differently and that the record did not show the other inmate was dangerous merely because he was a gang dropout or informant.

The court further concluded that even if records had shown that the other inmate had a history of violence, Torfason had not produced evidence connecting that history to liability by the defendants. Sheriff Bernal could not be held responsible merely because he supervised other employees. The court said liability against Bernal required evidence of his own actions, such as creating or implementing a housing policy, training, or supervision. Liability against Monterey County required evidence of a county policy that caused the housing placement. The court found no such evidence.

Second, Torfason argued that the court improperly credited a jail supervisor’s declaration stating that the other inmate’s jail records showed no prior violent incidents, while failing to credit Torfason’s evidence. The court said Torfason’s unsworn assertions were not evidence and that an affidavit from another inmate did not explain how the witness knew the other inmate had a history of assaults. In any event, the court said its decision did not depend on resolving that factual dispute because the evidence still did not show that the defendants were liable for the housing placement.

Third, Torfason argued that sensitive-needs inmates had been housed in a medium-security unit contrary to jail policy and that compliance with the policy would have kept him and the other inmate apart. The court stated that the reconsideration motion was unsworn, so these assertions were not evidence. It also said any evidence Torfason could have offered on this point would not have been new because he knew about the issue before the summary-judgment ruling. Finally, because the alleged placement violated the jail policy, the court concluded that the County, Bernal, and the other officials could not be held liable on that basis under the reasoning already explained.

Ruling

Judge Jeffrey White concluded that Torfason had not shown grounds for relief under Rule 59(e) from the decision granting summary judgment to the defendants. The court DENIED Torfason’s motion for reconsideration and stated that the order terminated docket number 88.