Haltigan v. Drake

Background

John D. Haltigan sued Michael V. Drake, Cynthia K. Larive, Benjamin C. Storm, and Katharyne Mitchell in their official capacities at the University of California or the University of California, Santa Cruz. Haltigan challenged UC Santa Cruz’s requirements and guidance concerning diversity, equity, and inclusion statements for prospective faculty members. The complaint asserted two First Amendment claims: one based on unconstitutional conditions and one based on viewpoint discrimination.

The complaint alleged that UC Santa Cruz required a diversity, equity, and inclusion statement for every faculty job opening and used categories and a starting rubric to evaluate those statements. It also alleged that the rubric favored certain sociopolitical views. Haltigan alleged that the requirement made applying futile because of his views on colorblind inclusivity, viewpoint diversity, and merit-based evaluation. He alleged that he wanted a position at the University, but he did not allege that he had applied or prepared application materials for the July 2022 Developmental Psychology position.

Motion and Standing Analysis

The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), which addresses the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that Haltigan lacked Article III standing. They also moved under Rule 12(b)(6), which concerns whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court granted the Rule 12(b)(1) motion and did not decide the Rule 12(b)(6) motion or the merits of the First Amendment claims.

The court explained that standing generally requires an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; a connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct; and a likelihood that judicial relief would remedy the injury. It applied the general rule that a person usually cannot challenge an application policy without actually applying for the benefit or position at issue.

Haltigan argued that he had “competitor standing,” a doctrine that can allow a person to challenge a selection process without applying if the person is able and ready to compete. The court found that the complaint did not adequately allege those facts. His statement that he desired a position at the University was not enough. The complaint did not allege an anticipated timeframe, preparations for applying, relevant discussions, efforts to identify likely openings, or regular opportunities to apply. His general academic job search and applications to other universities also did not establish an imminent and concrete injury from UC Santa Cruz’s specific process.

Haltigan also argued that First Amendment principles allowed him to challenge the requirement without applying. The court said it was unclear whether that type of First Amendment standing argument could be considered under Rule 12(b)(1), because the relaxed rules discussed in the cited cases involved prudential standing rather than the constitutional injury required for federal jurisdiction. In any event, the court found those cases distinguishable because they concerned licensing or permitting systems, not a competitive job-application process.

Finally, the court considered whether applying would have been futile. It concluded that the complaint did not show that UC Santa Cruz’s policies unambiguously made Haltigan’s application futile. The court reasoned that, had he applied, the University might have accepted his application based on his qualifications or research background. The complaint did not allege a direct and disqualifying rule based on an applicant’s diversity, equity, and inclusion statement.

Disposition

The court held that Haltigan had not established standing because he had not applied to the challenged process, had not shown that he was able and ready to apply, and had not adequately alleged futility. Judge Edward J. Davila granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. Because the court found pleading deficiencies that might be corrected, it could not determine that further amendment would be futile. The court ordered that any amended complaint be filed by February 2, 2024.