Manalastas v. Joie de Vivre Kabuki, LLC

Background

Charisma Manalastas alleged that she was hired in 2016 as a front desk agent for Hotel Kabuki. She alleged that, after she complained about a coworker’s job performance, the coworker treated her poorly and threatened physical assault. She also alleged that, after she suffered a lumbar sprain at work and reported work limitations, management removed her from the schedule, later put her back on the schedule, and continued assigning the coworker to work with her.

Manalastas filed charges with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing and then filed an eight-count lawsuit in San Francisco County Superior Court against Hotel Kabuki, Hyatt Corporation, and Michael Marquez. The complaint alleged violations of California discrimination, retaliation, and harassment statutes, as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress. The case was later before this court. The opinion addresses a motion to dismiss, or alternatively to quash service, and two motions concerning whether another party’s materials should be sealed.

Motion to Quash Service

A motion to quash service asks the court to set aside defective delivery of the summons and complaint. The court explained that, under California law, a corporation may be served through specified officers, a designated service agent, a general manager, or another person authorized to receive service. California law does not always require strict compliance, but the plaintiff must show substantial compliance and actual delivery to an authorized person.

The defendant argued that Manalastas served a front desk employee at Hotel Kabuki who was not authorized to accept service. Manalastas responded that a San Francisco Sheriff’s Department officer was supposed to serve the Human Resources Manager and said she did not personally know who was actually served.

The court found that Manalastas had not shown valid service. She did not dispute that a front desk employee was served, did not provide evidence that the employee was authorized to accept service, and did not allege that the employee held one of the positions listed in California’s service statute. The court also found no indication that the employee had sufficient authority or rank to make it reasonably certain that the defendant would learn of the service.

The court therefore found service insufficient and stated that the defect deprived it of jurisdiction over the defendant. Instead of dismissing the complaint, the court exercised its discretion to quash service and allow another opportunity for proper service. The motion to quash was GRANTED. Because service was quashed, the court did not address the defendant’s additional arguments unless and until Manalastas establishes jurisdiction.

Motions Concerning Sealing

The defendant filed two administrative motions asking the court to consider whether materials filed by Manalastas should be sealed. The materials included medical records, detailed descriptions of medical conditions, and other personal information.

The court applied the “compelling reasons” standard, which requires specific reasons for sealing judicial records that outweigh the public’s strong interest in access. The court noted that Manalastas had not filed a statement or declaration explaining why sealing was warranted. It also noted that she had publicly filed the materials in the state-court docket and again publicly filed them in this court.

The court found no basis for sealing on the record presented and DENIED both motions to consider whether another party’s materials should be sealed. The order states that Manalastas may file a new sealing motion if she complies with the court’s local rule.

Conclusion

Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. GRANTED the defendant’s motion to quash service. The court gave Manalastas 45 days to complete proper service and warned that failure to return the summons showing proof of service within that period will result in dismissal without further notice, unless she timely requests an extension and shows good cause. The court DENIED the defendant’s two motions concerning sealing. The opinion includes an earlier reference to a 30-day period in discussing another decision, but the operative conclusion gives Manalastas 45 days.