Gilton v. City and County of San Francisco

Background

Barry Gilton and his children—Ali Gilton, Barry Gilton, Jr., and Laprell Gilton—sued the City and County of San Francisco, Sgt. Damon Jackson, and Officer Reese Burrows. The plaintiffs alleged that Jackson and Burrows fabricated evidence and coerced witness testimony to portray Gilton as a member of the Central Divisadero Playas, a criminal enterprise, and that the defendants maliciously prosecuted him.

Gilton had been tried in federal court in connection with the killing of Calvin Sneed. A jury acquitted him of murder in aid of racketeering but convicted him of conspiring to conduct the affairs of a racketeering enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Judge Orrick later granted Gilton’s motion for acquittal because the evidence did not establish that he had committed a prior racketeering act, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision.

The second amended complaint asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims for constitutional violations by people acting under state authority. Gilton asserted claims for fabrication of evidence, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and failure to intervene. The plaintiffs also asserted a municipal-liability claim against San Francisco, and Gilton’s children asserted claims for loss of familial relations.

Statute of Limitations

The defendants argued that the claims were filed too late. The court rejected that argument. It concluded that Gilton’s due-process claims based on fabricated evidence accrued when the criminal proceedings ended in his favor, which occurred when the Ninth Circuit affirmed his acquittal on January 14, 2022. Because the civil lawsuit was filed less than ten months later, the court held that the claims were not time-barred.

Fabrication-of-Evidence Claim

The court held that Gilton plausibly alleged that Jackson and Burrows deliberately fabricated evidence. The alleged evidence included an organizational chart portraying Gilton as a Central Divisadero Playas member, statements that he frequented a gang hideout, and allegedly coerced testimony from a witness.

However, the court held that Gilton did not plausibly allege causation. The court took notice of evidence from the criminal case showing that the government had other evidence connecting Gilton to Central Divisadero Playas members, including his relationships with members, his presence with them at certain locations, a video showing him with members, and his participation in Sneed’s murder with two Central Divisadero Playas members. The court concluded that the challenged evidence was incidental to the other evidence and could not plausibly have caused the decision to prosecute Gilton. The fabrication-of-evidence claim was dismissed with prejudice.

Malicious-Prosecution Claim

A malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983 requires, among other things, a prosecution without probable cause. The court explained that a federal grand-jury indictment creates a presumption that probable cause existed, although that presumption can be rebutted by showing that the prosecution was induced by fraud, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct undertaken in bad faith.

The court held that Gilton did not plausibly rebut the presumption. It found that the alleged facts and judicially noticed evidence supported probable cause to believe that Gilton was connected to Central Divisadero Playas and participated in Sneed’s murder. The court emphasized that evidence insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may still establish probable cause to prosecute. The malicious-prosecution claim was dismissed with prejudice.

Derivative Claims and Municipal Liability

The parties agreed that the children’s loss-of-familial-association claims, as well as the conspiracy and failure-to-intervene claims, depended on Gilton’s fabrication-of-evidence and malicious-prosecution claims. Because those underlying claims failed, the court dismissed the derivative claims.

The court also dismissed the claim against San Francisco under the municipal-liability doctrine commonly called Monell liability. A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation, but the court found that the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged an underlying constitutional violation. It therefore concluded that municipal liability did not arise on these facts.

Disposition

The court held that the claims were not time-barred but were not plausibly alleged for other reasons. The motion to dismiss was granted with prejudice, and the plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed.