Davis v. Kijakazi

Background

Michael Davis applied for disability insurance benefits in February 2018, alleging disability beginning in October 2016. He remained insured through December 31, 2021. After an earlier administrative law judge found him not disabled, the Appeals Council reversed that decision and sent the case back for a new hearing. A new administrative law judge, Raymond Rodgers, again found Davis not disabled, and the Appeals Council affirmed. Davis then sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment.

The record described several physical conditions, including degenerative disc disease in the cervical and lumbar spine, right shoulder tears and degenerative changes, carpal tunnel syndrome after surgery, left-hip and left-thumb osteoarthritis, a right trigger thumb, diabetes with neuropathy, and obesity. Davis also alleged depression, an adjustment disorder, and mild cognitive impairment. He testified about pain, numbness, neuropathy, fatigue, sleep apnea, and difficulty using a computer or sitting for extended periods.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision

At step one of the required five-step disability analysis, the administrative law judge found that Davis had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 9, 2016. At step two, the judge found his physical impairments severe but found his medically determinable mental impairments nonsevere, meaning they caused no more than mild limitations in his ability to perform basic work activities. At step three, the judge found that Davis’s impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment. At step four, the judge found that Davis could perform his past relevant work, so the analysis did not proceed to step five.

Mental Impairments

Davis argued that the administrative law judge failed to consider the entire record and overlooked evidence showing more serious mental limitations. The court disagreed. The judge assessed four broad areas of mental functioning: understanding and using information, interacting with others, concentrating and maintaining pace, and adapting or managing oneself. The judge found only mild limitations in each area.

The court pointed to evidence that Davis could perform simple household maintenance, prepare meals, attend medical appointments, take medications, shop, follow healthcare instructions, watch television, read, care for children, and manage his medical care. The administrative law judge also relied on opinions from Dr. A. Acenas, Dr. R. Solomon, and Dr. B. Rudnick, as well as Dr. Wong’s diagnosis of a mild mental impairment. The court acknowledged that the administrative law judge did not mention some symptoms in Dr. Wong’s evaluation, but held that this omission did not require reversal because the judge considered the evaluation and the broader record supported a nonsevere finding.

The court also rejected Davis’s argument that the administrative law judge falsely stated he had not received specialized psychiatric treatment or mental-health counseling. The court found that Davis had not undergone specialized psychiatric treatment for his mental impairment and that the evidence supported the administrative law judge’s conclusion.

Residual Functional Capacity and Past Work

Davis argued that the residual functional capacity, meaning the work a person can still perform despite medical limitations, failed to include all of his reaching and manipulation restrictions. The court held that substantial evidence supported the residual functional capacity. The administrative law judge relied on objective medical evidence, medical opinions, and prior administrative medical findings, and found that examinations were largely normal and that the medical findings were reasonably accommodated by the residual functional capacity.

The court also noted that Davis reported improvement in his hands after carpal tunnel surgery, later evaluations did not recommend additional treatment, and later records showed that he lifted weights of up to thirty pounds for exercise. Based on this evidence, the court held that Davis could perform his past relevant work.

Symptom Testimony and Medication Side Effects

Davis argued that the administrative law judge improperly rejected his testimony about his symptoms. The court explained that, when there is no evidence of malingering, an administrative law judge must give specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting testimony about the severity of symptoms. The court found that the administrative law judge met that standard.

The administrative law judge relied on examinations that were largely within normal limits, including full strength in the upper and lower extremities and full grip strength, while also considering findings such as tenderness, painful neck movement, and reduced sensation in the left arm at times. The judge also considered improvement with treatment, examination findings showing full movement of the fingers, and evidence that Davis could perform daily activities independently.

The court separately rejected Davis’s argument about medication-related fatigue. The opinion states that the record contained no objective or other evidence showing that medication caused additional work limitations. It also states that Davis denied medication side effects several times. The court therefore found no error in the administrative law judge’s treatment of those allegations.

Disposition

Judge William Alsup held that substantial evidence supported the administrative law judge’s findings and that the decision was free of legal error. The court denied Michael Davis’s motion for summary judgment, granted Kilolo Kijakazi’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and ordered judgment entered.