The Humane Society of the United States v. Perdue
- Laurel Beeler
- 3:20-cv-01395
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 19
In The Humane Society v. Perdue, Judge Beeler dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, allowing amendment within 21 days.
The five nonprofit plaintiffs, the USDA and FSIS, the named agency officials, and chicken slaughterhouses affected by the challenged waiver criteria.
What happened
The Humane Society of the United States and four other nonprofit organizations challenged U.S. Department of Agriculture decisions allowing some chicken slaughterhouses to increase line speeds from 140 to 175 chickens per minute. They claimed the 2018 decision violated the Administrative Procedure Act and environmental-review requirements.
The court held that the plaintiffs had not shown that their alleged injuries were connected to the 2018 waiver criteria or could be remedied by the requested relief, especially after the agency changed the waiver system in 2022. The court did not decide the plaintiffs’ other arguments about final agency action, venue, or transfer.
Judge Beeler dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, without prejudice and with leave to amend. The plaintiffs had 21 days to file an amended complaint; otherwise, the court said it would enter judgment for the defendants.
The detailed version
- The Humane Society of the United States v. Perdue · No. 3:20-cv-01395
- Laurel Beeler
- Feb. 22, 2024
Background
Five nonprofit organizations—the Humane Society of the United States, Animal Outlook, Government Accountability Project, Mercy for Animals, and Marin Humane—challenged the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) decision in 2018 to allow certain chicken slaughterhouses to seek waivers from a 140-chickens-per-minute line-speed limit. The waivers could permit speeds of up to 175 chickens per minute.
The plaintiffs alleged that higher line speeds would increase inhumane treatment of chickens, food-safety risks, worker injuries, and environmental harm. They asserted four claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, including that FSIS had changed existing requirements without the required rulemaking, acted arbitrarily and unlawfully, and failed to prepare an environmental-impact statement required by the National Environmental Policy Act. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including an order vacating the 2018 decision and related waivers.
After the case began, FSIS stopped accepting applications under the 2018 criteria. In 2022, FSIS terminated the waivers issued under those criteria and allowed establishments with those waivers to apply for modified waivers under new criteria that incorporated the 2018 line-speed increase. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of standing, argued that the 2018 criteria were not final agency action, and challenged venue. They alternatively sought transfer to the District of Columbia.
Standing analysis
Standing is the legal requirement that a plaintiff show an actual or imminent injury, a connection between that injury and the defendant’s conduct, and a likelihood that the requested court relief would remedy the injury. The court focused on whether the plaintiffs’ injuries were traceable to the 2018 waiver criteria and whether the requested relief could redress them.
The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not shown traceability or redressability. The challenged 2018 criteria were guidance that helped authorize waivers but were not themselves the ultimate actions authorizing the slaughterhouses’ conduct. The regulatory landscape had also changed: FSIS had terminated the 2018 waivers, added criteria in 2022, and was not accepting line-speed waiver applications on any basis. The court said the validity of an individual waiver appeared to depend on more than the 2018 criteria alone. Because the operative complaint did not address these changes, the court could not determine standing based on that complaint.
The court separately considered organizational and associational standing. It held that none of the organizations had shown organizational standing based on their own alleged diversion of resources and frustration of their missions. The court concluded that the Humane Society had adequately alleged associational standing on behalf of its members, at least apart from the redressability problem. It also concluded that the Humane Society had adequately connected its alleged procedural injury under the National Environmental Policy Act to concrete environmental and aesthetic interests. The other plaintiffs could not establish standing based only on the alleged procedural injury.
Other issues
The defendants also argued that the amended complaint failed to state a claim because the 2018 decision was not final agency action. The court reserved that issue for consideration after any amended complaint because of the changed regulatory circumstances. The court likewise reserved the venue and transfer issues.
Disposition
The court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of standing as to all plaintiffs. It dismissed the complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend. The plaintiffs were required to file any amended complaint within 21 days and attach a comparison showing changes from the current complaint. If they did not amend, the court said it would enter judgment in favor of the defendants. The order resolved ECF No. 25.
Read the full 19-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.