Lee v. Mally

Background

John Henry Lee was proceeding without a lawyer when he filed this civil-rights action against Danny Mally and other defendants. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on untimeliness was granted on September 16, 2019. The court stated that the claims fell outside the applicable limitations period even after accounting for statutory tolling based on arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment. The court also clarified that summary judgment was not granted merely because Lee did not oppose the motion; it was based on review of the full record and consideration of whether the record, read favorably to Lee, supported his claims.

On January 25, 2024, more than four years after judgment, Lee filed a motion for “equitable tolling” seeking reconsideration under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and 60(d)(2). The defendants opposed the motion.

Rule 60(b)(1)

Rule 60(b)(1) permits relief from a judgment for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, but the motion must be filed no later than one year after entry of judgment. The court held that Lee’s motion was untimely because it was filed more than four years after judgment.

The court also held that Lee would not qualify for relief even if the motion were timely. In evaluating excusable neglect, the court considered prejudice to the defendants, the length and effect of the delay, the reason for the delay, and Lee’s good faith. It found considerable prejudice because the events underlying the claims were about ten years old, creating risks to witness recollection and evidence, and because the defendants would have to reopen their defense after more than four years of finality. The court found Lee’s delay substantial and unjustified.

Lee said he did not know about an order granting him additional time to oppose summary judgment because the order was mailed to his former prison. The court held that Lee was responsible for not filing the required notice of address change. It also found that the court clerk could not reasonably know that the address on Lee’s extension motion was intended to be his permanent mailing address. Lee had not explained why he failed to ask about the status of his motion or case for more than four years. The court concluded that the reason for the delay strongly weighed against excusable neglect and that the good-faith factor weighed slightly against it.

The court further found that Lee had not shown inadvertence, surprise, or a legal or factual mistake in the summary-judgment order. His motion did not identify any error in that order or any basis for equitable tolling that was apparent in the record when the order was issued.

Equitable Tolling

Because the action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court applied California’s statute of limitations and California’s equitable-tolling rules. Those rules can provide relief from a limitations deadline when a plaintiff reasonably and in good faith pursues another legal remedy. The court identified three relevant considerations: timely notice to the defendant, lack of prejudice in defending the later claim, and the plaintiff’s good-faith and reasonable conduct. The court held that Lee had not given notice of his claims in any earlier proceeding or tribunal and therefore had not shown entitlement to equitable tolling.

Rule 60(d)(2)

Rule 60(d)(2), through 28 U.S.C. § 1655, permits relief for a defendant who was not personally notified of an action. The court held that this provision does not apply to plaintiffs, who initiate their own actions and therefore do not need notice that the action exists.

Disposition

The court denied Lee’s motion for equitable tolling. The order resolved docket number 22.