Doe v. Becerra

Background

The petitioner was identified in the body of the opinion as G.C. and in the caption as John Doe. The opinion states that he was a 31-year-old wildland firefighter who had lived in the United States since arriving from El Salvador as a child. He had been detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement for nearly two years while challenging his removal. The government detained him under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which generally requires detention of certain noncitizens with qualifying criminal convictions during removal proceedings.

An immigration judge ordered the petitioner removed to El Salvador after denying his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. He then filed a petition for review in the Ninth Circuit and sought a stay of removal. The opinion states that he had not received an individualized bond hearing during his detention.

Jurisdiction

The government argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because the petitioner had not named his immediate custodian—the warden of the privately operated detention facility—as a respondent. The court rejected that argument. It reasoned that the facility’s warden had no power to release the petitioner and no meaningful legal or factual interest in the issues raised by the petition. The court concluded that a named government respondent, the San Francisco Field Office Director for Immigration and Customs Enforcement, was within the district and had discretionary authority to release the petitioner. The court therefore held that the immediate-custodian rule did not prevent jurisdiction in this case.

Due-Process Analysis

The petitioner brought an as-applied challenge, meaning he argued that applying § 1226(c) to his prolonged detention without an individualized bond hearing violated procedural due process in his particular circumstances. The court applied the three-factor balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge: the person’s private interest, the risk of an erroneous deprivation under existing procedures and the value of additional safeguards, and the government’s interests and administrative burdens.

The court found that the petitioner had a strong liberty interest in avoiding prolonged detention. It acknowledged that his litigation challenging removal contributed to delays, but held that his liberty interest was not materially diminished because he pursued lawful administrative and judicial review. The court also found that the petitioner’s prior convictions did not justify a categorical assumption, without individualized consideration, that he was a flight risk or dangerous.

The court concluded that all three Mathews factors favored an individualized bond hearing. It held that the government’s interests in ensuring the petitioner’s appearance and protecting public safety could be protected through such a hearing. The court agreed with the government that the hearing should occur before an immigration judge, but held that the government—not the petitioner—must prove by clear and convincing evidence that continued detention was warranted.

Disposition

The court granted the petition to the extent stated in the order. It ordered that the petitioner be released from confinement on March 28, 2024, on suitable conditions unless, before that date, the government provided a bond hearing before an immigration judge. To continue detention, the government would have to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner presented a current risk of flight or danger such that no conditions short of detention could reasonably ensure his appearance or community safety. The hearing and the immigration judge’s decision were also required to be transcribed.