Vincent Pastore-v-County of Santa Cruz

Background

Vincent Pastore alleged that the County of Santa Cruz and individual defendants Robyn Grant, Tony Falcone, Kevin Fitzpatrick, and Kent Edler took improper nuisance-abatement actions concerning two properties. The alleged actions included inspections, abatement orders, confiscation of personal property, destruction of 30 medical marijuana plants, solicitation of a timber-operations complaint, criminal charges, and restrictions on pumping water from a permitted well.

Pastore’s First Amended Complaint asserted seven claims: retaliation for exercising the right to petition the government under the First Amendment; denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment; an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment; violations of substantive and procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; violations of the California Tom Bane Civil Rights Act; trespass; and conversion. The federal constitutional claims were treated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute that allows claims against people acting under state law for violating federal rights.

Defendants moved to dismiss all claims for failure to state a claim. They also argued that the action was barred under the rule recognized in Heck v. Humphrey because a judgment for Pastore could undermine related criminal convictions. The court took judicial notice of government-issued records but did not accept disputed facts in those records as established.

Federal claims

The court dismissed Claim 1, the First Amendment retaliation claim, with leave to amend. Pastore adequately alleged adverse actions that could chill an ordinary person from petitioning the government. But he did not allege facts plausibly showing that a lawsuit he previously filed against the County substantially caused the alleged retaliation. The complaint did not identify when that earlier lawsuit or settlement occurred, and the other legal actions mentioned in the complaint occurred after the April 2014 inspection.

The court dismissed Claim 2, the equal-protection claim, with leave to amend. The claim was based on a “class of one” theory, which requires allegations that the defendants intentionally treated the plaintiff differently from similarly situated people without a rational basis. The court found that Pastore did not identify any comparable property owners who were treated differently, and that his allegation about other similarly situated property owners was conclusory. The court did not decide whether discretionary county code enforcement is generally compatible with a class-of-one claim.

The court dismissed Claim 3, the Fifth Amendment takings claim, with leave to amend only as specified. It dismissed without leave to amend any claim based on property properly removed under the County Code as part of nuisance abatement, including the property removed or confiscated during the June 2, 2014 actions. The court also rejected a takings claim based on the water-pump controller for the same reason. To the extent the claim rested on Pastore’s belief that the County would deny a future building permit, the court found the claim unripe because Pastore had not alleged that he applied for and was denied such a permit. Amendment was allowed only if he could allege that he applied for and was denied a permit to build a residence on the properties.

The court dismissed Claim 4’s procedural-due-process portion with leave to amend as specified. Although Pastore alleged that his property was taken without notice or a meaningful hearing, judicially noticeable records showed that he appeared at administrative hearings concerning both abatement orders, presented evidence, and received decisions from administrative hearing officers. The court found no alleged defect in those proceedings. Amendment was allowed only if Pastore could add allegations identifying a procedural defect in the administrative hearings.

The court dismissed Claim 4’s substantive-due-process portion without leave to amend. It concluded that the complaint did not plausibly allege clearly arbitrary and unreasonable conduct unrelated to the County’s legitimate interest in abating public nuisances. In light of the administrative record, the court found that amendment would be futile.

State-law claims and jurisdiction

The remaining claims asserted violations of California law, including the California Constitution, the Bane Act, trespass, and conversion. Because all federal claims were dismissed, the court considered whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction, meaning jurisdiction over related state-law claims accompanying federal claims. After weighing judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. It dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice to refiling in state court.

The court noted that if Pastore filed an amended complaint, he could address deficiencies identified in the defendants’ motion. It also noted that California law appeared to preclude damages actions for violations of several California constitutional provisions, but the court did not decide the state-law claims on their merits.

Other dispositions

A footnote states that Joseph Lenchner’s claims under the First Amended Complaint were dismissed with prejudice because Lenchner had died and no motion to substitute a party was filed within 90 days after the filing of the case-management statement reporting his death.

The court did not reach the defendants’ argument under Heck v. Humphrey because it had already dismissed all claims for failure to state a claim and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Pastore was permitted to file a Second Amended Complaint within 21 days of entry of the order.