Jenkins v. FCA US LLC

Background

The plaintiff sought to bring a class action concerning an alleged defect in the tracklight on 2014–2023 Dodge Durango vehicles. The complaint alleged that water could enter through the tailgate’s gaskets and seals. In 2020, the plaintiff purchased a used 2019 Dodge Durango from Kia of Stockton and also purchased an extended warranty from that dealership. In January 2023, the plaintiff noticed water in the vehicle’s tracklight. A service employee allegedly said that FCA’s three-year, 36,000-mile limited warranty had expired because the vehicle had traveled more than 42,000 miles, and that repair would cost about $1,300. The plaintiff did not have the repair performed.

FCA moved to dismiss the first amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. The court also applied Rule 9(b), which requires fraud-based claims to describe the alleged misconduct in detail, including who did what, when, where, and how.

Standing

FCA argued that the plaintiff lacked standing because he did not allege that the water affected the vehicle’s lights or camera system or caused physical injury or other property damage. The court rejected that argument. It held that allegations that the plaintiff would have paid less for the vehicle, or would not have purchased it, if the defect had been disclosed were enough to allege an injury in fact. The court did not grant FCA’s motion on standing.

Implied-warranty claims

The court dismissed causes of action 2 and 11, which asserted common-law breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and breach of an implied warranty under California’s Song-Beverly Act. The court stated that California law requires contractual privity—a direct contractual relationship—with the defendant for these claims. Because the plaintiff bought the used vehicle and extended warranty from Kia of Stockton, and did not allege that FCA partnered with the dealership to offer the extended warranty, the court found insufficient privity with FCA.

Express-warranty claim

The court dismissed cause of action 3, the express-warranty claim. It found that FCA’s limited warranty had expired by mileage when the claim became ripe. The court also found that the plaintiff had not adequately alleged that the warranty was unconscionable, meaning unfairly one-sided or imposed without a meaningful choice. The court noted that the plaintiff did not allege that he lacked other options for buying a similar vehicle or obtaining broader warranty protection, and that he had purchased an extended warranty from Kia.

Song-Beverly and Magnuson-Moss claims

The court dismissed cause of action 10, the Song-Beverly Act claim. It held that the plaintiff could not state that claim because he bought a used vehicle from a Kia dealer and did not allege that FCA or its agent issued a full new-car warranty with the sale.

The court also dismissed cause of action 1 under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The parties agreed that this federal warranty claim rose or fell with the state-law warranty claims. Because the court found that the state-law warranty claims failed, it found that the Magnuson-Moss claim failed as well.

Fraud-based claims

FCA challenged causes of action 4, 5, 7, and 8, which it described as fraud-based claims, on the grounds that they were barred by the economic-loss rule, lacked a transactional relationship between the parties, and did not satisfy Rule 9(b).

The court rejected FCA’s economic-loss argument as to the fraudulent-concealment claim. It relied on California authority stating that alleged presale concealment that induces a consumer to enter a contract can be distinct from a later breach of warranty and therefore is not necessarily barred by the economic-loss rule.

The court nevertheless granted FCA’s motion to dismiss the fraud-based claims based on the lack of sufficiently pleaded dealings between the plaintiff and FCA. The court stated that a duty to disclose generally arises from direct dealings, not merely from a manufacturer’s relationship with the public at large. The plaintiff alleged that he viewed FCA advertisements and website material, spoke with sales representatives at Putnam Chrysler Jeep Dodge, and relied on an FCA warranty. The court found that more facts about the representatives’ agency relationship with FCA and the content of the advertisements could potentially establish the required relationship.

The court also found that the fraud-based claims did not meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. The complaint did not specify the representations on which the plaintiff relied, what information FCA allegedly suppressed, how FCA concealed the defect, or when and where FCA should have disclosed it. The court allowed amendment and directed the plaintiff to include relevant marketing materials and more details about interactions with sales representatives and whether they acted as FCA’s agents.

False-advertising claim

The court dismissed cause of action 9 under California’s False Advertising Law. The plaintiff alleged generally that he viewed advertisements and spoke with a salesperson, but did not identify the advertisements or their contents, state what the sales representative said, or allege that the representative acted as FCA’s agent. The court granted leave to amend with factual support for the alleged advertising and the identity of the party or agent that made it.

Equitable claims

The court dismissed the claims for unjust enrichment, unfair competition, and injunctive relief under the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act. It found that the complaint repeated the same factual allegations used for the warranty, fraud, and consumer-protection claims rather than identifying a distinct factual basis. The court granted leave to amend to allege a separate factual basis. The court also noted that it was unclear whether the plaintiff could state an unjust-enrichment claim because he bought the vehicle used from a third party.

Disposition

Judge Jeffrey S. White granted FCA’s motion to dismiss in part, with leave to amend. The court did not dismiss on standing grounds. It set April 12, 2024, as the deadline for an amended complaint if the plaintiff chose to file one.

Name discrepancy

The case caption identifies the plaintiff as Brian Jenkins, while the opinion’s opening paragraph refers to Plaintiff Drian Jenkins. The opinion text does not explain the discrepancy.