Flournoy v. Basu

Background

James Henry Flournoy, identified in the opinion as a pretrial detainee at Marin County Jail, filed a complaint without a lawyer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that, when he arrived at the jail from other county jails in 2021 and 2022, Nurse Practitioner Joseph Francis Bielefeld refused to continue or taper a documented Suboxone prescription for opioid addiction. Flournoy alleged that he suffered severe withdrawal and that Bielefeld, Dr. Anjuli Basu, and Licensed Vocational Nurse Luisa Nolasco denied or ignored his requests for medical help.

Flournoy further alleged that, after he was prescribed Suboxone in 2023, Deputy Sheriff/Officer Barragan and Nolasco falsely accused him of diverting it on September 14, 2023. He alleged that Bielefeld then discontinued the medication and Basu approved the discontinuation. He described withdrawal symptoms including severe pain, vomiting, nausea, depression, cold sweats, insomnia, delirium, and suicidal thoughts. He sought damages and declaratory and injunctive relief, including a preliminary injunction requiring jail officials to reinstate the prescription.

Screening ruling

Because Flournoy sought relief from governmental officers, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The court explained that a complaint may be dismissed at screening if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks money from an immune defendant. The court also stated that a pretrial detainee’s claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is evaluated under an objective standard under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

The court held that, liberally construed, Flournoy’s allegations about the discontinuation of Suboxone and the resulting withdrawal symptoms appeared to state arguably cognizable due-process claims under § 1983 against Basu, Bielefeld, Nolasco, and Barragan. The court therefore ordered those defendants to be served. This was a screening and service determination, not a final decision on liability or on whether Flournoy would prevail.

Preliminary-injunction request and case management

The opinion’s discussion states that Flournoy’s motion for a preliminary injunction was denied without prejudice because the defendants had not yet been served, and notice generally is required before a preliminary injunction may issue. The court explained that Flournoy could move for a temporary restraining order, which may issue without advance notice if the required conditions are met.

The conclusion ordered service without prepayment of fees, directed the defendants to file a summary-judgment or other dispositive motion within 90 days unless they informed the court that such a motion was inappropriate, and allowed discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It also set requirements for responses and replies and warned that failing to prosecute the case or comply with orders could result in dismissal under Rule 41(b).

The conclusion instructed the clerk to terminate the motion listed on the electronic docket as item 4—the preliminary-injunction motion—as denied without prejudice. It separately instructed the clerk to terminate the motion listed as item 6—the motion to compel a ruling on the complaint and preliminary-injunction motion—as moot. The order did not enter judgment on the underlying medical-care claims.