Bernard M. v. Kijakazi

Background

Bernard M., representing himself, sought judicial review under the Social Security Act of the Commissioner’s decision denying his application for child disability benefits. The opinion states that Martin O’Malley had been substituted for Kilolo Kijakazi as Commissioner under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).

Bernard M. alleged that he was unable to work from September 24, 1984, through September 24, 1988, because of vision-related problems arising from albinism. The opinion states that he had been legally blind his entire life and had received special education. He testified that his central visual acuity during the relevant period ranged from 20/190 to 20/200.

The administrative law judge issued a decision on May 17, 2022. At the second step of the required five-step disability analysis, the administrative law judge found that Bernard M. did not have an impairment that significantly limited his ability to perform basic work activities for at least twelve months. The administrative law judge therefore found that Bernard M. was not disabled and ended the analysis at that step.

Issues and Analysis

Bernard M. raised three arguments: that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence, that specific medical records required verification and review, and that the hearing should not have been conducted by video teleconference. The court addressed the challenge to the evaluation of his visual impairment and his testimony. Because the court ordered further proceedings on those grounds, it did not decide the remaining arguments.

The court held that the administrative law judge erred by failing to discuss an August 1986 Rhode Island Hospital emergency-department report. The report, which fell within the relevant disability period, stated that Bernard M. was legally blind. The court considered the report significant and probative, meaning that it was important evidence that could support Bernard M.’s claim. The administrative law judge’s written decision said that no relevant-period medical evidence concerning Bernard M.’s vision was available, but the 1986 report was such evidence.

The court also criticized the administrative law judge’s reliance on two 1978 assessments. One was an intellectual assessment, and the other involved educational testing; neither was a medical examination. The assessments were conducted years before the relevant disability period. The court concluded that relying on those assessments while failing to address the 1986 medical report was consequential, not harmless, because the court could not confidently determine that the administrative law judge would reach the same result after considering the report.

The court separately found that the administrative law judge did not provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting Bernard M.’s testimony about the severity of his visual impairment. The decision stated generally that his testimony was not entirely consistent with the evidence, but it did not identify the testimony being rejected or explain which evidence undermined it. The court noted that Bernard M.’s testimony about visual acuity of 20/190 to 20/200 was significant because the regulation cited in the opinion defines statutory blindness as central visual acuity of 20/200 or less in the better eye with a correcting lens.

Disposition

Judge Peter H. Kang reversed the Commissioner’s final decision and remanded the action for further administrative proceedings. The court granted Bernard M.’s motion to remand. The remand requires reconsideration consistent with the order, including consideration of the 1986 Rhode Island Hospital report and Bernard M.’s testimony about his central visual acuity. The court did not award benefits and did not decide Bernard M.’s remaining arguments.