Sanchez v. City of Fremont

Background

Kimberlee Sanchez, Samantha Just, Kaleb Durmas, Nicole Patterson, Lester Rogers, and Danielle Rivers sought a temporary restraining order preventing the City of Fremont from removing them from temporary housing. The opinion also treated people named in supporting declarations as plaintiffs for purposes of the motion. The plaintiffs participated in Fremont’s Winter Relief Program, which provided temporary hotel rooms, meals, housekeeping, evening check-ins, and case-management services to unhoused individuals during the winter months.

Participation was voluntary and required an agreement stating that the program was temporary and would end in April 2024. Participants were limited to belongings fitting in two plastic storage containers and were responsible for removing their property when they left. Fremont issued five notices between March 13 and April 29, 2024, stating that participants had to leave by 10:00 a.m. on May 1, 2024. The notices described housing resources, safe-parking options, possible short-term extensions for some households, and referrals to a housing navigation center.

The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment based on a state-created danger, the Fourth Amendment based on an unlawful seizure, and the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The complaint mentioned the Americans with Disabilities Act as a basis for jurisdiction but did not assert an ADA claim.

Court’s analysis

A temporary restraining order requires a showing of likely success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without relief, a favorable balance of hardships, and consistency with the public interest. The court first addressed standing, the requirement that each plaintiff show a concrete injury caused by the challenged conduct that a court decision could likely remedy. The court treated the individuals named in the complaint and supporting declarations as plaintiffs for purposes of the motion, but ordered anyone seeking to continue as a plaintiff to be named in an amended complaint signed by all plaintiffs and, if necessary, to submit an application to proceed without paying filing fees by June 3, 2024. Otherwise, the case would proceed only on behalf of Sanchez, the only person who signed the complaint.

On the Fourteenth Amendment state-created-danger claim, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail. The court noted that the parties disputed why the program did not secure permanent housing, but found that Fremont’s five notices gave the plaintiffs sufficient notice that the program was ending and that they needed to seek alternatives. On the current record, the court could not conclude that Fremont acted with deliberate indifference to a known danger.

On the Fourth Amendment claim, the plaintiffs alleged that they had to abandon possessions that did not fit in the two permitted bins. The court found that they did not allege Fremont seized their belongings and that Fremont’s evidence showed repeated notice that participants had to make arrangements for their property. The court therefore found that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on an unlawful-seizure claim.

On the Eighth Amendment claim, the court explained that the relevant protection concerns the criminal process and that the cited precedent involved criminal penalties for unhoused people who could not obtain shelter. Here, the complaint did not connect the plaintiffs’ circumstances to the criminal process beyond mentioning a municipal camping ordinance. Fremont represented that it had not enforced state or local law against Sanchez and had not issued citations against her. The court also noted that Fremont had offered shelter to each plaintiff and concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on this claim.

The court found that the possible loss of personal belongings constituted irreparable harm, particularly because the plaintiffs were facing homelessness again without possessions they had accumulated before entering the program. But the court found that the balance of hardships did not favor relief because the plaintiffs had notice that the program would end and had received repeated warnings and information about available resources. The public interest also did not favor an order stopping the closure because Fremont had offered housing alternatives and other services, and the Winter Relief Program provided temporary housing resources during a period when unhoused people were especially vulnerable.

Ruling

The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order. The denial concerned the requested temporary relief; the opinion did not enter a final judgment on the underlying constitutional claims.

The court ordered that any individual seeking to proceed as a plaintiff must be named in an amended complaint signed by all plaintiffs and must submit any required application to proceed without paying filing fees by June 3, 2024. It granted the fee-waiver applications filed by Sanchez, Rivers, Durmas, Patterson, and Just. The Clerk was directed to issue summons, and the U.S. Marshal was directed to serve Fremont without prepayment of fees.