Elghembri v. Muhammad

Background

Ahmed Mohamed Elghembri, a prisoner proceeding without a lawyer, alleged that Imam Muhammad, a chaplain at San Quentin State Prison, had prevented him from practicing his religion for about five years by interfering with his participation in a valid “Jumm’ah service,” a communal Muslim service held on Fridays. The amended complaint asserted claims under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Screening decision

The court reviewed the amended complaint under the prisoner-complaint screening statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. That review requires the court to identify claims that may proceed and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, inadequately pleaded, or seek money from an immune defendant. The court concluded that, when read liberally, Elghembri’s allegations stated cognizable claims under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and RLUIPA. “Cognizable” means claims legally sufficient to move forward at this stage; the order did not decide the ultimate merits of those claims.

Service and next steps

The court ordered the clerk to issue a summons and directed the U.S. Marshal to serve Muhammad, without requiring advance payment of service fees, with the operative complaint, attachments, and the order. Service was to proceed through the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s electronic-service program for prisoner civil-rights cases. The order also established procedures for determining whether Muhammad would waive service and for completing formal service if he would not.

The order directed Muhammad to file a dispositive motion, or notify the court that he would not file one. The order specifically addressed a possible motion for summary judgment based on failure to exhaust available administrative remedies and stated that any summary-judgment motion must comply with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It also set deadlines for Elghembri’s opposition and Muhammad’s reply, allowed discovery under the federal rules, and required the parties to serve each other with communications filed with the court.

The introduction states that the dispositive motion or notice was due by September 3, 2024, while the conclusion states that a summary-judgment motion was due on or before September 2, 2024. The order also states in the introduction that Elghembri’s request to proceed without prepaying fees was denied as moot because that status had already been granted; the conclusion separately states that the motion was denied. The clerk was directed to terminate all pending motions.