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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled June 4, 2024

Doe v. Eating Recovery Center LLC

Judge
Vince Chhabria
Docket
3:23-cv-05561
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
3
Civil ProcedureMotion to Dismiss
In one sentence

In Doe v. Eating Recovery Center LLC, Judge Chhabria partly granted and partly denied dismissal, allowing privacy claims to proceed while dismissing the unfair-competition claim.

Who this affects

Jane Doe’s CIPA and CMIA claims against Eating Recovery Center LLC may proceed, while her UCL claim was dismissed.

What happened

Jane Doe sued Eating Recovery Center LLC over its alleged use of Meta Pixel on its website. She claimed that the technology disclosed users’ medical information without consent and intercepted communications, asserting claims under California’s Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA), Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA), and Unfair Competition Law (UCL). ERC asked the court to dismiss the case, including for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The court concluded that Doe had adequately alleged personal jurisdiction. It also found that her CIPA claim could proceed under an aiding-and-abetting theory because the complaint alleged that Meta intercepted communications while they were being transmitted. The court found that the CMIA claims were adequately pleaded, including claims based on intentional disclosure and, alternatively, negligent release of confidential medical information.

The court dismissed the UCL claim because the complaint did not plausibly allege economic injury. Judge Vince Chhabria therefore denied ERC’s motion to dismiss in part and granted it in part: the CIPA and CMIA claims may proceed, while the UCL claim is dismissed.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Doe v. Eating Recovery Center LLC · No. 3:23-cv-05561
Judge
Vince Chhabria
Date
June 4, 2024

Background

Jane Doe sued Eating Recovery Center LLC (ERC) based on ERC’s alleged use of Meta Pixel on its website. The opinion addresses ERC’s motion to dismiss. Doe asserted claims under California’s Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA), California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA), and California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL).

Personal Jurisdiction

ERC challenged the court’s personal jurisdiction, meaning the court’s authority to exercise power over ERC. ERC relied primarily on a Ninth Circuit decision that was later vacated after the Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the matter en banc. The court stated that, even if the earlier decision had remained valid, Doe’s complaint adequately alleged personal jurisdiction over ERC.

CIPA Claim

The court held that Doe adequately pleaded a CIPA claim under an aiding-and-abetting theory. ERC argued that Doe had not alleged that Meta intercepted communications “in transit.” The court rejected that argument at the pleading stage because the complaint alleged that Meta’s transmission of information through the Pixel was instantaneous and that Meta’s code redirected users’ communications simultaneously with their website activity. The CIPA claim may proceed.

CMIA Claims

The court held that Doe plausibly alleged that ERC violated sections 56.10 and 56.101 of the CMIA. Section 56.10 concerns disclosure of medical information without consent, while section 56.101 concerns maintaining or preserving the confidentiality of patients’ medical information. The court found that Doe adequately alleged ERC disclosed users’ medical information through its use of Meta Pixel and failed to preserve its confidentiality.

ERC argued that the section 56.101 claim should be dismissed because Doe alleged intentional disclosure rather than negligence. The court explained that, at the pleading stage, a plaintiff may assert theories that appear inconsistent. It found that Doe adequately alleged both that ERC’s conduct could constitute intentional disclosure and, at minimum, negligent release of confidential medical information.

The court did not decide which damages provision would apply. It stated that the answer could depend on whether Doe ultimately proves intentional disclosure or only negligent release.

UCL Claim and Disposition

The court dismissed the UCL claim because the complaint did not plausibly allege economic injury resulting from the alleged conduct. The court found insufficient Doe’s allegations concerning a possible market for individual medical data, including the allegation that she could no longer use such markets because her information had allegedly been disclosed to Meta.

The court denied ERC’s motion to dismiss in part and granted it in part. The CIPA and CMIA claims may proceed, and the UCL claim is dismissed.

The authoritative version

Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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