Bluestar Genomics v. Song

Background

Bluestar Genomics moved for relief from Magistrate Judge Cisneros’s non-dispositive pretrial order. That order denied Bluestar’s request to compel Chunxiao Song to produce documents responsive to Bluestar’s requests for production. The documents were located on the University of Oxford’s computer system.

Bluestar argued that Song had possession, custody, or control over the documents, including documents that Bluestar characterized as Song’s personal documents and documents related to consulting services for Bluestar. Bluestar also argued that Song’s earlier production of documents from the Oxford system showed that he had the legal right to obtain and produce them, that Oxford’s server should not shield relevant documents from discovery, and that Judge Cisneros’s order was internally inconsistent.

Legal standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), a district court generally defers to a magistrate judge’s decision on a non-dispositive matter unless the decision is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. A decision is contrary to law if it applies the wrong legal standard or fails to consider an element of the applicable standard. The district court may not simply replace the magistrate judge’s judgment with its own. It may overturn factual findings only if it is firmly convinced that a mistake was made.

Rule 34 requires production of relevant documents that are in the responding party’s “possession, custody, or control.” The court explained that control means a legal right to obtain documents upon demand. The party seeking production bears the burden of proving control.

Court’s analysis

Judge Cisneros relied on Song’s employment contract, Oxford’s information-technology regulations, and Oxford’s January 16–17, 2024 email correspondence with Song. Oxford’s attorney stated that documents Song could access as an Oxford employee would generally belong to Oxford, could contain confidential or privileged information, and could be produced only by Oxford or with Oxford’s independent consent. Oxford also told Song that it did not consent to his producing the documents for the requests at issue.

Judge Cisneros therefore found that Song lacked control—meaning the legal right to produce—all responsive documents from the Oxford computer system. She also found that Bluestar had not met its burden of proving that Song controlled the documents.

The district court rejected Bluestar’s argument based on Song’s earlier production. Judge Tigar explained that Song had previously produced the documents believing Oxford had consented, and that even if Oxford had consented earlier, Bluestar cited no authority showing that Oxford could not withdraw that consent.

The court also rejected Bluestar’s argument that Song necessarily controlled documents because they were personal. Bluestar cited no case establishing a different control test for personal documents stored on an employer’s computers or servers. The court further stated that labeling a document personal does not override the employer’s possessory interest in its servers. The court found that a case Bluestar cited did not apply because, unlike Song, the person in that case had not explained or supported why she could not access her own messages and emails.

Finally, the court found no internal inconsistency in Judge Cisneros’s order. Song’s use of Oxford’s system for files unrelated to his Oxford work could violate Oxford’s technology policy, but that alleged violation would be a matter between Song and Oxford and would not eliminate Oxford’s authority over its servers. The court also found that another case cited by Bluestar did not require production because that case involved an admission by a company’s chief executive officer that he possessed the company’s records; Bluestar presented no comparable evidence that Song admitted possessing the documents at issue.

Disposition

Judge Tigar concluded that Bluestar had not shown that Judge Cisneros’s order was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. The court denied Bluestar’s motion for relief from the magistrate judge’s non-dispositive pretrial order.