J.M. v. Kijakazi
- Joseph Spero
- 3:20-cv-07196
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 5
In J.M. v. Kijakazi, Judge Spero granted counsel’s motion for $32,085 in Social Security attorney fees from past-due benefits.
J.M., their family, and Helen Zane, who represented J.M.; the order determines the attorney fee paid from past-due Social Security benefits.
What happened
J.M. v. Kijakazi concerned counsel’s request for attorney fees after the court previously ordered the Social Security Administration to calculate and pay benefits to J.M. and their family. Counsel sought $32,085 under the law governing fees for court representation in Social Security cases.
J.M. had agreed to pay counsel 25% of past-due benefits if the case succeeded. Counsel submitted the agreement and records showing 35.65 hours of work. The court found that the requested fee was reasonable, that counsel’s work was not substandard, and that the result was excellent.
Judge Spero granted the motion and awarded counsel $32,085. The court also noted that the earlier $7,000 fee awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act would be paid to J.M. if the requested fee was granted.
The detailed version
- J.M. v. Kijakazi · No. 3:20-cv-07196
- Joseph Spero
- June 4, 2024
Background
Helen Zane represented J.M. under a contingency-fee agreement. The agreement provided for a fee equal to 25% of past-due benefits received by J.M. and their family if J.M. prevailed. J.M. had brought the case to challenge the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income.
On March 2, 2022, the court granted J.M.’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, and sent the case back to the Social Security Administration for immediate calculation and payment of benefits. After that ruling, notices stated that past-due benefits had been calculated for J.M. and a minor child, with amounts withheld for a potential attorney-fee award. The notices reflected different calculations of J.M.’s past-due benefits, including $92,201.00 initially and $84,918.55 after accounting for past supplemental security income payments. A separate notice stated that $46,088.00 in past-due auxiliary benefits for J.M.’s minor child had been calculated, with $11,522.00 withheld for attorney fees.
The court had previously approved a stipulated $7,000 fee award under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Counsel requested $32,085 under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), which governs attorney fees for representation in court in Social Security cases. Counsel stated that, if the § 406(b) request were granted, the Equal Access to Justice Act fee would be paid to J.M. Counsel submitted time records showing 35.65 hours of work, making the requested fee an effective rate of $900 per hour.
Legal standard
Under § 406(b), a court may approve a reasonable fee for an attorney who represented a claimant in court after the claimant receives a favorable judgment. The fee may not exceed 25% of the claimant’s past-due benefits. Under Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, courts first consider the contingency-fee agreement and then test the requested fee for reasonableness. A court may reduce a fee for poor representation, delay, or a fee that is disproportionate to the time spent. Courts may approve both § 406(b) fees and Equal Access to Justice Act fees, but the attorney must return the smaller fee to the claimant.
Court’s analysis and ruling
The court found the fee request reasonable. It found that the contingency-fee agreement was valid, that the submitted time records were reasonable, and that there was no evidence of substandard work or a fee disproportionate to the work performed. The court also found that counsel obtained an excellent result and that the $900 effective hourly rate was within the range approved by courts in comparable cases.
The court therefore granted the motion for attorney fees and awarded counsel $32,085.00 under § 406(b).
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.