Means v. Lyft, Inc.

Background

Tabatha Means alleged that she was sexually assaulted by a Lyft driver on April 28, 2019, in Florida. She alleged that the driver followed her into her residence and raped her. She also alleged that Lyft knew about sexual assaults by its drivers and inadequately addressed passenger safety by, among other things, failing to perform adequate background checks, allowing culpable drivers to continue driving, and failing to adopt reasonable monitoring procedures.

Means asserted nine causes of action against Lyft and 50 Doe defendants: negligence, misrepresentation, negligent failure to warn, negligent infliction of emotional distress, common-carrier liability, other non-delegable duties to provide safe transportation, vicarious liability, breach of contract, and strict product liability. In opposing the motion, Means conceded her breach-of-contract claim. The opinion does not state a separate disposition of that claim in its conclusion.

Lyft moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim, and Rule 9(b), which requires fraud-based claims to be pleaded with particular detail. Lyft argued that the negligence-based and product-liability claims were untimely and that the common-carrier, vicarious-liability, negligent-hiring, and misrepresentation claims were inadequately pleaded.

Statute of Limitations

The court concluded that Means’s negligence-based and product-liability claims were timely. Florida generally provided a four-year limitations period for the claims at issue, while California provided two years for negligence and product-liability claims but ten years for civil actions seeking damages resulting from sexual assault. The court held that California’s ten-year period applied to claims against entities other than the alleged assailant when the claims sought damages resulting from sexual assault. Because the claims were timely under either state’s law, the court applied California law and denied Lyft’s motion to dismiss those claims as untimely.

Common-Carrier Liability

The court held that Florida law applied to Means’s common-carrier claim. Florida law expressly states that a transportation network company is not a common carrier. Although California law could treat transportation network companies as common carriers, the court found that California lacked a real and legitimate interest in applying its law because the alleged conduct occurred in Florida and Means was not alleged to be a California resident. Applying Florida law, the court held that Lyft was not a common carrier as a matter of law and granted dismissal of the common-carrier claim.

Vicarious Liability

The court also applied Florida law to Means’s vicarious-liability claim. Under Florida law, the court held that sexual assaults and batteries generally fall outside the scope of employment and therefore do not support vicarious liability under either respondeat superior or apparent agency. The court granted dismissal of the vicarious-liability claim.

Negligence Claims

The court applied California law to Means’s negligent-hiring, negligent-entrustment, negligent-supervision, and negligent-retention theories because the parties did not show a material difference between Florida and California law on those issues. Means acknowledged that she lacked information about specific warning signs or “red flags” that Lyft disregarded when hiring the driver. The court therefore granted dismissal of those theories.

The court separately stated that, to the extent Means based her negligence claim on Lyft’s alleged failure to train and monitor its drivers as a group, that theory was not subject to dismissal. The court noted that Means alleged Lyft knew of numerous prior sexual assaults and failed to adopt available procedures to reduce them.

Misrepresentation

The court applied California law and Rule 9(b) to Means’s affirmative-misrepresentation and omission theories. It held that Means did not identify specific statements sufficient to support an affirmative-misrepresentation claim and that the limited allegations about two blog posts did not describe the extensive advertising campaign involved in a prior California Supreme Court case allowing less-specific pleading.

As to omissions, the court held that Means did not identify with the required detail a statement from which an omission was made and on which she relied. The court granted dismissal of the misrepresentation claim.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part Lyft’s motion to dismiss:

- It denied the motion to the extent Lyft sought dismissal of Means’s negligence and product-liability claims as untimely. - It granted the motion to dismiss Means’s common-carrier claim. - It granted the motion to dismiss Means’s vicarious-liability claim. - It granted the motion to dismiss the negligent-hiring, negligent-entrustment, negligent-supervision, and negligent-retention claim concerning the driver. - It granted the motion to dismiss Means’s misrepresentation claim.

The court granted Means leave to amend the deficiencies discussed in the opinion and set July 12, 2024, as the deadline for filing a second amended complaint, if any.