Chazen v. Williams

Background

Todd Richard Chazen was convicted by a jury of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. The sentencing court imposed a 252-month prison term after finding that he had at least four prior convictions qualifying under the Armed Career Criminal Act, a federal law requiring a sentence enhancement for certain firearm offenders with at least three qualifying convictions.

The prior convictions considered at sentencing included two Minnesota second-degree burglary convictions, second-degree assault, second-degree manufacture of a controlled substance, and escape from custody. In later proceedings, Chazen challenged whether his convictions qualified for the enhancement. The government agreed that the escape conviction no longer qualified in light of a Supreme Court decision invalidating the enhancement statute’s residual clause, but argued that the other convictions still supported the enhancement.

Issue

The parties agreed that the validity of the enhancement turned on the two burglary convictions. They also agreed that the escape and drug convictions no longer qualified, and Chazen appeared to concede that the assault conviction was a qualifying violent felony. Because three qualifying convictions were required, Chazen would be entitled to resentencing if the burglary convictions did not qualify.

The question was whether Minnesota second-degree burglary matched the federal definition of generic burglary under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The court also considered whether Chazen could bring the claim through a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 even though he had not raised it in his earlier challenge under § 2255.

Court’s reasoning

The court explained that the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson invalidated the residual clause of the enhancement statute as unconstitutionally vague. It further explained that, under Mathis, a state burglary statute qualifies only if its elements match generic burglary. If a state statute is broader, the conviction cannot count as generic burglary under the enhancement statute.

The court relied on decisions holding that Minnesota second-degree burglary does not qualify as a violent felony under the enhancement statute because the statute permits conviction without proof of intent to commit a crime. The court concluded that Chazen’s burglary convictions therefore could not serve as qualifying convictions.

The government argued that Chazen’s claim was barred because he could have raised it earlier. The court recognized that Chazen was raising the claim for the first time in this proceeding, but concluded that the claim was not barred. When Chazen filed his earlier § 2255 motion, binding Eighth Circuit precedent had treated the relevant Minnesota burglary offense as qualifying. The court found that it would have been futile for Chazen to raise the burglary argument during his earlier proceedings. The government did not identify another basis for denying relief.

Disposition

The court granted Chazen’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241. It transferred the case to the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota for resentencing without regard to the Armed Career Criminal Act enhancement in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

Judge

The opinion was signed by District Judge James D. Peterson.