Hocking v. Berryhill

Background

Ivy Hocking sought judicial review of the Social Security Administration’s final decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. She alleged that cancer, cancer treatment, thyroid problems, fatigue, cognitive impairment, and related conditions prevented her from maintaining competitive employment.

The administrative law judge found that Hocking had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 19, 2012. The judge identified anxiety disorder and mild cognitive disorder as severe impairments and found that her impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment. The judge assessed a residual functional capacity—the most a person can do despite her limitations—to perform work at all exertional levels, subject to limits involving routine, repetitive, fixed, and predictable tasks without a strict production-rate pace or significant workplace changes.

The judge found that Hocking could not perform her past relevant work. Based on vocational-expert testimony, however, the judge found that she could perform other jobs, including hand packager, machine packager, and machine feeder, that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. The judge therefore found that Hocking was not disabled.

Issues and Analysis

Hocking argued that the administrative law judge improperly determined that her fatigue-related impairments were not severe. The court explained that an impairment is severe when it significantly limits basic work activities. It concluded that substantial evidence supported the finding that fatigue was not a severe physical impairment. The court relied on medical opinions questioning whether chemotherapy from thirty years earlier caused Hocking’s current symptoms, state-agency opinions that fatigue was not severe, and evidence of Hocking’s daily activities.

Hocking also challenged the findings concerning depression and anxiety. The court rejected the argument because any alleged error would not have changed the result. In other words, Hocking did not show that the administrative law judge would have reached a different disability decision even if the alleged error had not occurred.

Hocking argued that the administrative law judge gave too little weight to the opinions of her provider, Sandra L. Stover, M.D. The court held that the judge gave adequate reasons for doing so, including inconsistencies between Dr. Stover’s opinions and other medical observations, laboratory testing showing that Hocking’s thyroid was stable or only slightly outside the expected range with adjusted medication, and evidence suggesting that depression rather than cancer treatment contributed to her fatigue.

Finally, Hocking challenged the residual-functional-capacity finding, arguing that it did not account for the time she needed to complete daily activities or her cognitive difficulties. The court concluded that the finding was supported by substantial evidence. It noted evidence that Hocking lived alone, handled personal care, prepared meals, drove into town, did laundry and lawn work, exercised, cared for sled dogs, and showed normal performance on most cognitive measures with only mild difficulty acquiring memories.

Disposition

The court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision denying Hocking disability insurance benefits. It denied Hocking’s motion for summary judgment, granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the case with prejudice. The order was signed by United States Magistrate Judge Franklin L. Noel.