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D. Minn.Procedural orderFiled Sept. 7, 2018

Christianson v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC

Judge
Donovan Frank
Docket
0:17-cv-01525
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
11
Motion to DismissCivil ProcedureTort
In one sentence

In Christianson v. Ocwen, Judge Frank denied Ocwen’s motion to dismiss TCPA and negligence claims, allowing the lawsuit to proceed.

Who this affects

The ruling allowed Shelly Christianson’s Telephone Consumer Protection Act and common-law negligence claims against Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, to proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage.

What happened

In Christianson v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Shelly Christianson alleged that Ocwen repeatedly called her cellphone to collect a debt, including at least 1,459 calls after she asked the company to stop. She brought claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and for negligence.

Ocwen asked the court to limit older telephone-consumer-protection claims under the four-year filing deadline and to dismiss the negligence claim. The court ruled that a related class action paused the filing deadline for Christianson’s claims, even though she filed her individual lawsuit before that class action’s certification decision. The court also found that her allegations of repeated calls, privacy invasion, and emotional distress were enough to support the negligence claim at this stage.

Judge Donovan W. Frank denied Ocwen’s motion to dismiss in its entirety. The TCPA and negligence claims therefore remained in the case.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Christianson v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · No. 0:17-cv-01525
Judge
Donovan Frank
Date
Sept. 7, 2018

Background

Shelly Christianson sued Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227, and common-law negligence. She alleged that Ocwen called her frequently and at unreasonable times to collect a debt, using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice. She alleged that she received at least 1,459 calls, despite revoking prior express consent and repeatedly asking Ocwen to stop. The alleged calls occurred between April 2, 2011, and April 7, 2014, and again after December 15, 2015.

Christianson sought damages and injunctive relief for the alleged TCPA violations, invasion of privacy, and harm and distress from the calls. Her amended complaint asserted negligent TCPA violations, knowing or willful TCPA violations, and common-law negligence.

Statute of limitations

Ocwen argued that Christianson’s TCPA claims arising before May 9, 2013, were barred by the four-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). Christianson argued that the limitations period was paused under the American Pipe tolling doctrine because of a related proposed class action filed against Ocwen in Illinois on October 27, 2014. Christianson did not join that class action and filed her individual case before the class was certified.

The court held that American Pipe tolling applied even though Christianson filed her individual lawsuit before the related class action’s certification decision. The court rejected Ocwen’s argument that tolling was available only to people who waited until after class certification to file individual suits. It concluded that Christianson, as a putative class member, was entitled to the tolling benefit. The court stated that, because the related class action was filed on October 27, 2014, potential TCPA violations after October 27, 2010, were subject to liability under the four-year limitations period. The court therefore found that Christianson’s TCPA claims were adequately pleaded.

Negligence claim

Ocwen also argued that it owed Christianson no duty of care and that she did not adequately allege injury or causation. The court explained that Minnesota negligence law requires a duty of care, a breach, an injury, and a causal connection between the breach and injury.

The court concluded that Christianson was not relying on a special relationship between a lender and borrower. Instead, she alleged that Ocwen’s own conduct—repeatedly calling her after she asked Ocwen to stop—created a foreseeable risk of harm. The court found it plausible that nearly 1,500 calls, most occurring in a single year, could breach an ordinary duty of reasonable care. It also found sufficient her allegations of intrusion, invasion of privacy, wasted cellphone battery life, and emotional distress, and concluded that the alleged calls could plausibly have caused those injuries.

Disposition

The court denied Ocwen’s Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint in its entirety. The TCPA and common-law negligence claims therefore remained in the case at this stage.

The authoritative version

Read the full 11-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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