David G. v. Berryhill

Background

David G. sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying his application for disability insurance benefits. The administrative law judge found that David G. had severe impairments involving his cervical spine, obesity, a history of traumatic brain injury, and major depressive disorder, but did not specifically identify headaches as a separate severe impairment at the second step of the Social Security disability evaluation.

The administrative law judge found that David G. could perform a limited range of light work, with restrictions on climbing, reaching, instructions, workplace changes, and interactions with other people. The judge concluded that David G. could not perform his past work but could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. The Appeals Council declined further review, making the administrative law judge’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision.

Arguments and analysis

David G. argued that the administrative law judge erred by failing to classify his headaches as a severe impairment at step two. The court agreed that the administrative law judge treated the headaches as symptoms or limitations of other conditions instead of specifically considering whether they were a separate medically determinable impairment. The court cited medical evidence describing migraine, post-traumatic, and chronic headaches; headaches that caused missed work and forgetfulness; cognitive and memory problems; and headaches that had not responded to multiple treatments. The court found that this evidence showed the headaches were more than a slight abnormality and significantly limited basic work activities.

The court nevertheless concluded that the step-two error was harmless. Once an administrative law judge finds at least one severe impairment, the judge must continue the evaluation and consider all impairments, including non-severe ones. Here, the administrative law judge discussed the headaches at step four when assessing residual functional capacity, meaning the most work a person can perform despite limitations. The administrative law judge considered treatment records, the reported intensity and persistence of the headaches, medication effectiveness, normal imaging, neurological findings, cognitive testing, and medical opinions. David G. did not challenge the step-four analysis, the residual functional capacity assessment, or the treatment of the medical opinions. Because the administrative law judge considered the headaches later in the process, the court found no reversible error.

David G. also argued that the administrative law judge should have considered whether his headaches medically equaled Listing 11.02, which addressed epilepsy. The court explained that a condition medically equals a listed impairment only when its medical findings are at least equal in severity and duration to the criteria of the most similar listing. The court found that the record did not contain findings such as aura, altered awareness, nausea, extreme or throbbing pain, seizure-like patterns, loss of consciousness, convulsions, or nocturnal episodes significantly interfering with daytime activities. The court therefore found no error in the administrative law judge’s failure to assess equivalence to Listing 11.02.

Disposition

Judge Hildy Bowbeer denied David G.’s motion for summary judgment, granted Commissioner Nancy Berryhill’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the case. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.

Classification basis

This is a substantive ruling because the court reviewed the merits of the Social Security disability decision and affirmed the Commissioner’s denial of benefits by denying David G.’s motion and granting the Commissioner’s motion.