Larry W. v. Berryhill
- Katherine Menendez
- 0:17-cv-00988
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 15
In Larry W. v. Berryhill, Judge Menendez affirmed the denial of benefits, granted the Commissioner’s motion, denied Larry W.’s motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice.
Larry W.’s application for supplemental security income was denied, and the Commissioner’s decision finding him not disabled was upheld. The case was dismissed with prejudice.
What happened
In Larry W. v. Berryhill, Larry W. challenged the Social Security Commissioner’s decision denying his application for supplemental security income. He said heart problems, depression, and intellectual limitations prevented him from working.
The administrative law judge found that Larry W. could perform sedentary work with restrictions, including simple and repetitive tasks, no reading or writing, and limited exposure to hazards. The judge found that jobs existed in significant numbers that he could perform. Larry W. argued that the judge improperly evaluated his physical and mental limitations, his statements about his symptoms, and the vocational expert’s testimony.
Judge Katherine Menendez ruled that the administrative decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, denied Larry W.’s motion, affirmed the Commissioner’s decision, and dismissed the case with prejudice.
The detailed version
- Larry W. v. Berryhill · No. 0:17-cv-00988
- Katherine Menendez
- Sept. 27, 2018
Background
Larry W. applied for supplemental security income on August 30, 2013, alleging disability beginning January 1, 2008. He identified cardiomyopathy, depression, and borderline intellectual functioning as the causes of his alleged disability. His medical history also included hypertension, congestive heart failure, non-sustained ventricular tachycardia, and an implanted cardiac defibrillator.
The Social Security Administration denied his application initially and on reconsideration. After a hearing, Administrative Law Judge Mary M. Kunz found that Larry W. was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied review, making the administrative law judge’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment, asking the court to rule based on the administrative record.
Administrative Decision
Judge Kunz found that Larry W. had several severe impairments, including obesity, obstructive sleep apnea, non-ischemic cardiomyopathy with congestive heart failure, borderline intelligence, depression, anxiety disorder, personality disorder, and possible panic disorder with agoraphobia. She found that these impairments did not meet or equal the severity of a listed impairment.
The administrative law judge determined that Larry W. had the residual functional capacity—the ability to work despite his limitations—to perform sedentary work with restrictions. The work could not involve unprotected heights or nearby hazards, and it had to be routine, repetitive, simple, and low stress. It also could not require reading or writing. At the final step of the disability analysis, the judge found that Larry W. could perform jobs such as final assembler, document preparer, and stuffer.
District Court’s Analysis
The court reviewed whether the administrative law judge applied the law correctly and whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence, meaning relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate support for the conclusion. The court did not reconsider the disability claim from the beginning.
Physical limitations. Larry W. argued that the physical portion of his residual functional capacity was not supported by a medical opinion. The court rejected that argument, explaining that the residual functional capacity did not have to come directly from one specific medical opinion. The administrative law judge could consider the entire record, including medical records, medical observations, and Larry W.’s own descriptions of his limitations.
The court found substantial evidence supporting the finding that Larry W. could perform some work. The administrative law judge accepted that he had difficulty with sustained walking and heavy lifting and limited him to sedentary work, even though agency medical experts had found that he could perform light work. The court also relied on evidence that his cardiac symptoms improved when he took his medication and followed treatment. The court agreed that the administrative law judge could consider his repeated medication noncompliance when assessing the extent of his limitations.
Mental limitations. Larry W. argued that the administrative law judge improperly credited psychologist Donald E. Wiger’s opinion while giving less weight to opinions from psychologists Alford Karayusuf and Stephen J. Antonello. The court recognized that an administrative law judge must resolve conflicts among medical opinions and may give less weight to opinions that conflict with the record.
The court found support for giving greater weight to Dr. Wiger’s evaluation because he conducted his own psychological testing. The court also identified inconsistencies between Dr. Karayusuf’s assessment and other evidence concerning Larry W.’s memory, social activities, church attendance, insight, and judgment. The court agreed that the administrative law judge adequately explained why Dr. Antonello’s opinion received less weight, including that some conclusions lacked explanation and conflicted with other testing and observations.
Statements about symptoms. The court upheld the administrative law judge’s assessment of Larry W.’s statements about his symptoms. The administrative law judge considered his medication noncompliance, limited mental-health treatment, daily activities, and sporadic work history. The court found that these factors, together with evidence that his symptoms improved with treatment, supported the finding that his statements were inconsistent with the record as a whole.
Vocational evidence. Larry W. argued that the vocational expert’s testimony conflicted with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles because the listed jobs had reading requirements, while the administrative law judge’s restrictions prohibited reading and writing. The court rejected the argument. It explained that the Dictionary of Occupational Titles describes maximum requirements and does not necessarily account for variations in individual jobs. The court found no evidence that the vocational expert failed to consider Larry W.’s literacy restrictions.
Disposition
The court concluded that the Commissioner’s decision that Larry W. was not disabled was supported by substantial evidence. It granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, denied Larry W.’s motion for summary judgment, affirmed the Commissioner’s decision, and ordered that the matter be dismissed with prejudice.
Read the full 15-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.