Campbell v. St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc.

Background

Tanya L. Campbell sued St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc. (SJM), alleging pregnancy discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. SJM later brought a counterclaim alleging that Campbell violated the Illinois eavesdropping statute by recording a March 5, 2015, work-related conference call without the participants’ consent.

SJM hired Campbell as a clinical specialist in February 2014. Campbell said that after she announced her pregnancy and requested medical restrictions, SJM did not consider her for an open territory-manager position, denied her an expected promotion to clinical specialist III, treated performance complaints against her more seriously, and ultimately terminated her employment. SJM honored the medical restrictions but maintained that Campbell had performance problems and terminated her after she failed to complete a 30-day performance improvement plan.

Campbell also alleged that a client, Dr. Radden, sexually harassed her by touching her stomach and pubic area and making inappropriate comments. She reported the incident to SJM’s human-resources department. SJM told her to report the matter to the hospital because SJM did not control the doctor and said she would not have to work with him going forward. Campbell reported the incident to the hospital, which handled the matter to her satisfaction, although SJM employees mistakenly scheduled her to work with the doctor several times afterward and corrected those errors.

SJM’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is granted when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court views disputed evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion.

Pregnancy discrimination. The court denied summary judgment on Campbell’s pregnancy-discrimination claim. It held that the record could allow a reasonable jury to find that Campbell was qualified, suffered adverse employment actions, and was treated adversely under circumstances suggesting pregnancy discrimination. The court relied on evidence that Campbell had been well regarded before announcing her pregnancy, that performance complaints increased afterward, that Hutson commented that Campbell might not return after having her baby, and that SJM denied her promotions and later terminated her. SJM offered performance-based explanations, but the court found genuine disputes about the accuracy and extent of the alleged performance problems. A jury, rather than the court, must decide whether those explanations were a pretext for pregnancy discrimination.

Hostile work environment. The court granted summary judgment on Campbell’s hostile-work-environment claim. Although it described Dr. Radden’s conduct as plainly inappropriate, the court found that the incident was isolated and that SJM acted reasonably by removing Campbell from the doctor’s service. The court also noted that Dr. Radden was not an SJM employee and that SJM’s options were therefore limited.

Retaliation. The court denied summary judgment on Campbell’s retaliation claim. It found that Campbell engaged in legally protected activity by reporting the harassment, complaining to human resources about possible pregnancy discrimination, and filing charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The court concluded that the timing of the alleged retaliatory actions and the evidence challenging SJM’s performance-based explanations could support a finding of a causal connection and pretext. It therefore found a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

SJM’s Counterclaim

Campbell moved for judgment on the pleadings, which tests whether the pleaded facts, accepted as true, state a plausible claim for relief. SJM alleged that Campbell violated the Illinois eavesdropping statute by recording a call involving Campbell in Michigan, a participant in Texas, and a participant in Illinois, without consent.

The court granted Campbell’s motion. Even assuming the Illinois statute applied, the court held that SJM had not established entitlement to the damages it sought. SJM had not disclosed actual damages or the amount of claimed harm in discovery. The record also did not show the malice, violence, oppression, wanton recklessness, or criminal or wanton conduct required for punitive damages. The counterclaim therefore was dismissed.

Disposition

Judge David S. Doty ordered that SJM’s motion for summary judgment was granted in part and that Campbell’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted.