Johnson v. Hamilton

Background

Johnson brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims for violations of federal constitutional rights by people acting under state law. She sought damages based on an alleged unconstitutional arrest and use of force by Courtois. She also asserted claims against the City of Minneapolis and state-law claims for battery and false imprisonment against Courtois and the City.

The events occurred outside Bar Louie shortly after midnight on May 18, 2014. Hamilton arrested Johnson’s friend, Duncan, after observing what Hamilton suspected was alcohol being consumed from a flask while Duncan waited in line. Johnson approached and asked why her friend was being arrested. The accounts then differed. Hamilton testified that Johnson interfered with his handling of Duncan. Johnson denied touching Hamilton and said she was standing several feet away, asking questions calmly but urgently.

Johnson testified that Courtois approached her aggressively and shoved her. A video appeared to show Courtois approaching Johnson while she backed away, shoving her, and then returning to arrest her after she said, “You just pushed a woman! Fuck you!” Courtois testified that Johnson was approaching and yelling, and that he pushed her to keep her from coming closer. Courtois arrested Johnson for obstructing legal process under Minnesota Statutes section 609.50. He testified that the arrest was based on her failure to obey an order to leave, not on physical resistance.

Requests for admission

Johnson did not timely respond to requests for admission, so the requests were initially deemed admitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36. The relevant request stated that Johnson had touched Hamilton before her arrest. Johnson later served untimely responses denying the requests.

The court held that Johnson’s filings—including her complaints, opposition brief, deposition testimony, and arguments at the hearing—were enough to function as a motion to withdraw the admission. Under Eighth Circuit law, a court may allow withdrawal when doing so promotes presentation of the merits and does not unfairly prejudice the opposing party. The court found both requirements satisfied. Allowing withdrawal would let Johnson litigate her claims on their merits, and Courtois had time during discovery to question witnesses about the issue. The court therefore treated the admissions as withdrawn for purposes of the summary-judgment motion.

The court denied as moot Johnson’s separate motion seeking permission to file a motion out of time because it had already determined that her earlier filings constituted a request to withdraw the admissions.

Qualified immunity and the arrest claim

Qualified immunity generally protects government officials from damages when their conduct did not violate a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. The court considered whether the evidence, viewed in Johnson’s favor, showed a constitutional violation and whether the relevant right was clearly established.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits arrests without probable cause. Courtois argued that he at least had “arguable probable cause,” meaning a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed, to arrest Johnson for obstructing legal process. His argument relied largely on the premise that Johnson touched Hamilton. Because the court withdrew the admission and Johnson and her sister testified that she did not touch Hamilton, the court found a genuine factual dispute on that issue.

Courtois also argued that Johnson’s proximity to Hamilton and failure to move away supplied arguable probable cause. The court found disputes about how close Johnson was, whether Courtois reasonably perceived her as close enough to interfere, whether she was ordered to leave, and whether she complied. Accepting Johnson’s account, she was several feet away, asked why Hamilton was arresting her friend, and either was not told to move or was already backing away when Courtois shoved her. On that version of events, her speech and proximity would not constitute the physical obstruction prohibited by Minnesota’s obstruction statute, and her conduct would not provide arguable probable cause for arrest.

Qualified immunity and the force claim

The court applied the Fourth Amendment’s objective-reasonableness test to the shove and other force used during the arrest. That test considers the seriousness of the suspected offense, whether the person posed an immediate threat, and whether she was resisting or trying to flee.

The court rejected summary judgment based on the force used to make the arrest because factual disputes about whether the arrest was supported by probable cause also affected whether force used to carry out the arrest was justified. The court separately considered Courtois’s argument that the shove was reasonable crowd control intended to make Johnson back away.

Viewing the evidence in Johnson’s favor, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that she had committed no crime, posed no immediate threat, was not resisting or fleeing, and had either not been ordered to move or had already complied. Under those facts, Courtois had not shown that shoving her was objectively reasonable or that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also concluded that Johnson’s right to be free from that use of force was clearly established.

Disposition

The court ordered that the defendants’ summary-judgment motion be granted in part and denied in part:

- The motion was granted as to all claims against the City of Minneapolis and Officer Efrem Hamilton. - The motion was granted as to Counts 3 and 4, the state-law tort claims. - The motion was granted as to Counts 1 and 2 to the extent they alleged claims under the Minnesota Constitution. - The motion was denied in all other respects, leaving the remaining federal constitutional claims against Courtois unresolved at this stage. - Johnson’s motion to file a motion out of time was denied as moot.