Gamble v. Minnesota State-Operated Services

Background

David Le Roy Gamble, Jr., Cyrus Patrick Gladden, II, David James Jannetta, Jerrad William Wailand, Clarence Antonia Washington, and others sued Minnesota State-Operated Services, Minnesota State Industries, the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, the Minnesota Department of Human Services, the State of Minnesota, and individual defendants. The plaintiffs are individuals civilly committed to and in the custody of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program. They participated, or previously participated, in the program’s Patient Pay Program, a vocational work program.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Rehabilitation Act by retaining 50 percent of participants’ earnings. Minnesota law authorizes the Minnesota Sex Offender Program to retain that portion of earnings to offset operating costs. The plaintiffs moved for conditional certification of a collective action and approval of proposed notice and an opt-in period.

Report and Recommendation and Objections

Magistrate Judge Kathryn Menendez recommended granting the motion, subject to modifications. The recommendation would allow notice to people who worked in the Patient Pay Program from August 12, 2013, to the present—three years before the filing of the action.

The defendants objected to two aspects of the recommendation. First, they argued that the Fair Labor Standards Act limitations period runs from the date an individual opts into the collective action rather than from the filing of the complaint. Second, they argued that the applicable limitations period was two years, not three years, because the plaintiffs had not established a willful violation.

Court’s Analysis

The court reviewed the recommendation under the deferential standard applicable to a magistrate judge’s recommendation on a nondispositive pretrial matter. It would reject the recommendation only if it were clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

The court overruled the defendants’ first objection. It recognized that the Fair Labor Standards Act’s limitations period is tolled for an individual plaintiff when that person opts into the collective action, not when the complaint is filed. But the court held that this rule did not control which potential participants could receive notice. Otherwise, no one could receive notice before already joining the action. The court also explained that identifying August 12, 2013, as the earliest date for notice did not extend anyone’s claims to that date. It was only the earliest possible date on which an eligible participant could have last suffered a violation and still have a compensable injury if the plaintiffs ultimately prevailed.

The court also overruled the defendants’ objection concerning willfulness. At the initial certification stage, the magistrate judge properly declined to decide whether the alleged violations were willful. The court stated that the plaintiffs should have an opportunity to develop that theory and that potentially affected participants should receive notice, even though proving willfulness might be difficult in light of an earlier decision holding that program participants were not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Disposition

The court ordered three things: (1) the defendants’ objection to the Report and Recommendation was DENIED; (2) the Report and Recommendation was ADOPTED; and (3) the plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification and the proposed opt-in period was GRANTED subject to the modifications in the Report and Recommendation.

This order addressed conditional certification, notice, and the proposed opt-in period. It did not decide whether the plaintiffs ultimately proved that the defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act or the other laws cited in the complaint.