Benson v. Piper

Background

Michael D. Benson, who was civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, brought this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He represented himself and moved for appointment of counsel. He stated that he could not afford a lawyer, had limited access to legal materials, was being denied access to legal mail, and was not equipped to present his case. He also argued that the number of defendants made discovery, particularly depositions, impossible to conduct on his own.

Benson relied on a March 6, 2017, Minnesota Sex Offender Program memo stating that legal mail would be available during a designated weekday pickup period and that people unable to pick it up then should work with staff to “pro-socially find a solution.” Benson interpreted the memo as stopping his receipt of legal mail. Defendants responded that Benson continued to send and receive legal mail and had done so after the memo. They explained that the language was intended to encourage clients to work with staff to find a positive solution and pointed to an April 24, 2017, memo providing a process for arranging another pickup time when a person had a scheduling conflict.

Legal standard

The court explained that people in civil cases do not have a constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), the court may ask a lawyer to represent a person who cannot afford counsel. Relevant considerations include the factual and legal complexity of the case, the person’s ability to investigate and present the claims, whether testimony conflicts, and the complexity of the legal arguments. The court has substantial discretion in deciding whether representation is warranted.

Court’s analysis

The court first found that Benson’s claim that defendants were blocking his access to legal mail was unsupported by the record. The record showed that he could send and receive legal mail. His filings in another case also showed that he had submitted responses and motions by mail.

Second, the court found that Benson’s filings showed he could present his position and understood basic legal procedures. The court noted that his amended complaint was more than 20 pages long, included detailed factual allegations, and cited federal statutes, constitutional provisions, and procedural rules. The court also considered his other filings and his memorandum supporting appointment of counsel, which cited and discussed legal authorities.

Third, the court concluded that the factual and legal issues were not more complex than those in other civil-rights cases routinely brought before it. Fourth, although Benson generally asserted that his commitment limited his ability to investigate facts, he did not identify with sufficient specificity particular discovery that he needed but could not obtain.

The court recognized that civil commitment and the absence of formal legal training created challenges for self-representation. It nevertheless relied on an Eighth Circuit decision stating that similar difficulties faced by people bringing civil-rights claims, including limitations on interviewing witnesses and conducting discovery, did not establish that counsel had to be appointed. The court said that reasoning applied here even though Benson was civilly committed rather than incarcerated.

Disposition

Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung ordered that Benson’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel, ECF No. 35, was DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The court also directed the clerk to provide Benson with the court’s Pro Se Civil Guidebook. The order addressed only Benson’s request for appointed counsel; the opinion does not decide the underlying civil-rights claims.