Davis v. Hennepin County

Background

Leslie Davis and John D. Westley brought a False Claims Act case alleging that the defendants conspired to conceal the causes of the Interstate 35 West bridge collapse so Hennepin County could make false claims and obtain federal disaster relief, grants, congressional funding, and other federal funding for reconstruction. The relators also alleged that false claims concerned foreign materials and labor used in the reconstruction.

This was the relators’ third related False Claims Act case involving essentially the same allegations. The Government had declined to intervene in each case. The two earlier proceedings were dismissed without prejudice because the relators were proceeding without lawyers. In this case, the relators had legal representation. The Government moved to dismiss and later filed a notice confirming that it did not intend to intervene. The case had been unsealed, but the relators apparently had not yet served the defendants, so only the relators and the Government appeared in connection with the motion.

Government’s dismissal authority

The Government relied on 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A), which provides that the Government may dismiss a False Claims Act action over the relator’s objection if the relator was notified of the motion and the court provided an opportunity for a hearing.

The relators argued that the Government had given up its authority to dismiss by declining to intervene. The court rejected that argument. It interpreted the statute’s text and structure as imposing no intervention requirement. The court reasoned that intervention allows the Government to proceed with the action, while dismissal ends the action; therefore, the Government need not intervene when it seeks only to dismiss.

The court also addressed disagreement among federal appeals courts about whether the Government must show a valid purpose and a rational connection between that purpose and dismissal. One approach applies a two-step rational-relation test. Another recognizes an essentially unrestricted government right to dismiss, subject only to notice and an opportunity for a hearing. The court adopted the latter approach, holding that the statute’s plain language requires only those two safeguards. The court also stated that additional judicial constraints could interfere with the Executive Branch’s prosecutorial discretion.

The relators had been notified of the motion and had an opportunity to participate in a hearing. The court therefore found that the statutory requirements were satisfied. It added that even under the more demanding rational-relation test, dismissal would be proper because the Government stated that continuing the case would impose substantial burdens and expenses without a resulting recovery. The court also found that the relators had not supported their claim that the Government acted arbitrarily or in retaliation for a professional-misconduct complaint.

Evidentiary-hearing request and disposition

The relators separately requested an evidentiary hearing. The court explained that the statute requires a hearing on the dismissal motion but does not require an evidentiary hearing. Because the relators identified no statutory or other authority requiring that type of hearing, the court denied the request.

Judge Eric C. Tostrud ordered that the Government’s motion to dismiss was granted, that the relators’ complaint was dismissed with prejudice, and that judgment be entered accordingly.