Michael S. v. Berryhill

Background

Michael S. sought supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration initially denied his claim and upheld that decision on reconsideration. After a hearing, an administrative law judge denied benefits, and the agency’s Appeals Council declined further review. Michael S. then sought judicial review.

The administrative law judge found severe impairments involving antisocial personality disorder, bipolar or cyclothymic disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning. The judge found that these impairments did not meet or equal the requirements of the listed impairments in the agency’s regulations. The judge determined that Michael S. had the residual functional capacity—the most he could still do despite his impairments—to perform work at all physical exertion levels, subject to limits involving noise, simple and repetitive tasks, simple work-related decisions, and brief and superficial contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the public. The judge found that he had no past relevant work but could perform jobs such as general cleaner, kitchen helper, and night cleaner.

Issues and Analysis

Michael S. argued that the administrative law judge did not properly consider that his functioning occurred in the context of a structured residential program. The court recognized that the need for a structured living environment must be considered when assessing functional capacity. It concluded that the administrative law judge had considered Michael S.’s need for help with medication, finances, hygiene, and other daily tasks, along with his work at the Old Country Buffet, household chores, family activities, treatment records, and response to medication. The court also found that the administrative law judge’s questions to the vocational expert adequately reflected the limitations adopted in the residual functional capacity assessment.

Michael S. also challenged the treatment of medical opinions. His former psychotherapist, Kenneth Martens, identified severe limitations, including limitations in completing a normal workweek, interacting with others, responding to supervisors, and handling workplace stress. Other providers, including Rebecca Moore, Ricki Pribyl, and Marlae R. Cox-Kolek, offered opinions that Michael S. could not work full-time or needed substantial support. The administrative law judge gave little weight to these opinions and substantial weight to the opinions of state consultants Dr. Joseph Cools and Dr. Mark Berkowitz.

The court concluded that the administrative law judge gave adequate reasons for discounting the treating providers’ opinions. The court cited inconsistencies between Martens’s opinions and his own treatment notes, the records of other providers, Michael S.’s activities, and his work as a dishwasher. The court also found that the administrative law judge properly considered Global Assessment of Functioning scores as part of evaluating the consistency of Martens’s opinion, rather than using those scores alone to decide disability. Although the state consultants had not examined Michael S., the court held that the administrative law judge could rely on their opinions because they were consistent with the record as a whole and the judge explained that assessment. The court further concluded that additional medical consultation or testing was not required because the record provided an adequate basis for deciding the claim.

Disposition

The court concluded that the administrative law judge’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and that the judge did not err in evaluating the structured living evidence or the medical opinions. The order denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and dismissed the matter. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.