Murphy v. Minnesota Department of Human Services

Background

The plaintiffs are people with disabilities who receive Medicaid Home and Community Based Disability Waivers from Minnesota. They live in Community Residential Setting facilities, also described as corporate adult foster care, and seek access to individualized housing services that could help them pursue more integrated housing options. They allege that their current living arrangements isolate and segregate them from their communities in violation of federal law. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief concerning the Department’s administration of the Disability Waiver programs.

On September 29, 2017, the court certified a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). The class consists of all people age 18 or older who are eligible for and have received a Disability Waiver, live in a licensed Community Residential Setting, and have not been given the choice and opportunity to reside in the most integrated residential setting appropriate to their needs.

The defendant moved to decertify the class, arguing that discovery showed the named plaintiffs were no longer adequate representatives, that the class was not large enough, that the claims were not common or typical, that the requested relief could not be provided through one injunction, and that some class members lacked standing.

Court’s analysis

A court may change or revoke class certification before final judgment, but the court explained that decertification should generally be based on changed circumstances that were not present when the class was certified. The court concluded that the defendant had not shown such changed circumstances.

Adequate representation

Two named plaintiffs had moved into individualized and integrated homes. The court held that their individual circumstances did not moot the class’s claims because the class had acquired a legal status separate from the individual interests of the named representatives. The court also found that the two plaintiffs continued to protect the class’s interests and did not have conflicting interests. The defendant had not shown that the third named plaintiff no longer shared the class’s interests or had not suffered the same injuries. The class therefore continued to have adequate representation.

Numerosity and ascertainability

The defendant argued that the plaintiffs had identified too few actual class members and had not shown that class membership could be determined using objective information. The court relied on evidence in the record, including the Department’s own review and other materials, indicating that a sufficiently large group of similarly situated waiver recipients could be affected. The court reiterated that plaintiffs need not identify every class member or prove an exact number; they must provide a reasonable estimate. It also adopted its earlier conclusion that the class could be identified using objective data.

Commonality and typicality

The court rejected the argument that individual reasons why people had not moved to more integrated settings defeated commonality. It held that whether the Department’s administration of the waiver system was a substantial factor contributing to segregation was a factual question capable of classwide resolution. At the class-certification stage, the plaintiffs did not have to prove that they would prevail; they needed to show common questions that could be answered with common evidence.

The defendant also argued that notices given to the named plaintiffs about appeal rights made their claims atypical. The court reviewed the notices and found that general information about appeal rights was not a substitute for proper notice of a specific proposed adverse action. The court stated that the notices failed to comply with the Due Process Clause or Medicaid regulations and concluded that the typicality requirement remained satisfied.

Injunctive relief

The defendant argued that the court could not provide relief to the class through one injunction because people faced different barriers, including housing availability, income, employment opportunities, and criminal history. The court relied on a later decision from the District of Columbia Circuit stating that an injunction need not produce a perfect result if it gives each class member an increased opportunity to achieve a legally required outcome. The court concluded that the proposed injunction could at least partly increase each class member’s opportunity to live in the most integrated setting appropriate to that person’s needs, satisfying Rule 23(b)(2).

Standing

The defendant argued that the class definition included people who had not been injured by the Department and would not be affected by a court-ordered remedy. The court disagreed. It found that the Department’s administration of the waiver system potentially affected each class member’s choice and opportunity to live in the most integrated setting appropriate to the member’s needs. Because the proposed injunction would affect all participants in the waiver system in at least part, the court held that anyone within the class definition had standing.

Disposition

The court found that the defendant had failed to demonstrate changed circumstances warranting decertification. Judge Donovan W. Frank therefore denied the defendant’s Motion to Decertify the Class. The order did not decide the plaintiffs’ underlying claims or alter the class definition, although the court noted that the defendant could separately move to modify that definition.