Delores J. v. Saul

Background

Delores J., acting on behalf of Q.J.J., Jr., sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of the child’s application for supplemental security income. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The administrative law judge found that Q.J.J., Jr. had severe impairments of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, an anxiety or adjustment disorder, and asthma, but concluded that the impairments did not meet, medically equal, or functionally equal a listed impairment.

For a child, functional equivalence requires consideration of six areas: acquiring and using information; attending and completing tasks; interacting and relating with others; moving about and manipulating objects; caring for oneself; and health and physical well-being. The administrative law judge found a marked limitation in interacting and relating with others, but no marked limitation in any other area. Because the child did not have marked limitations in two areas or an extreme limitation in one area, the administrative law judge concluded that he was not disabled.

Arguments and Analysis

Delores J. argued that the administrative law judge failed to consider important evidence and improperly selected evidence supporting the denial. She particularly challenged the analysis of concentration, persistence, and pace; adapting or managing oneself; and the functional area of caring for oneself.

The court rejected the challenge to the administrative law judge’s paragraph B analysis of the listing. Although the administrative law judge did not mention some evidence in that specific portion of the decision, the court found that he discussed the same evidence in the later functional-equivalence analysis. The court also concluded that substantial evidence supported the findings concerning concentration, persistence, and pace and adapting or managing oneself.

The court agreed, however, that the analysis of caring for oneself was legally and factually deficient. The administrative law judge relied on the child’s ability to dress himself, maintain personal hygiene, put away clothes, take out the trash, and care for his physical needs. But the applicable regulation and Social Security guidance focus in this area on emotional self-regulation, including controlling behavior, managing frustration, remaining patient, and responding appropriately to changes in mood. The court concluded that the administrative law judge improperly relied on physical self-care tasks while overlooking evidence about the child’s emotional regulation.

The court nevertheless determined that the error did not require reversal or remand. The record showed that the child sometimes took from 10 minutes to an hour to calm down after school altercations, and teachers and state-agency consultants identified limitations in caring for himself. The court therefore found that the administrative law judge’s finding of no limitation in this area was unsupported. But the court also found that the administrative law judge’s ultimate conclusion—that the child did not have the required marked limitations—was supported by substantial evidence.

In particular, the record indicated that medication improved the child’s emotional control and concentration, while the medication was not always administered as prescribed, especially in the morning. The court also noted irregular therapy attendance. Based on the entire record, the court concluded that the child did not have the marked limitation needed in this functional area to establish disability.

Disposition

Judge Hildy Bowbeer ordered that Delores J.’s motion for summary judgment on behalf of Q.J.J., Jr. was denied, and the Acting Commissioner of Social Security’s motion for summary judgment was granted. The order directed that judgment be entered accordingly.