Chao V. v. Saul

Background

Chao V. sought review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying his applications for supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits. He alleged limitations from lower-back problems, back and leg pain, depression, and anxiety. After a hearing, the administrative law judge found severe impairments of depression and degenerative-disc-disease-related low-back pain with radiating pain in both legs.

The administrative law judge determined that Chao V. retained the residual functional capacity—the most he could still do despite his limitations—to perform light work subject to physical restrictions and a limitation to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. Because he could not perform his past relevant work but could perform other jobs, including plastic hospital-products assembler and plastics inspector, the administrative law judge found him not disabled. The Appeals Council declined review, making that decision the Commissioner’s final decision.

Issues and Analysis

Chao V. argued that the administrative law judge improperly rejected or failed to consider a learning-disorder diagnosis and should have considered the listing for intellectual disorder. The court found that the record contained evidence of below-average cognitive functioning and difficulties with processing, memory, learning, and information retrieval. It therefore questioned the administrative law judge’s decision not to treat the learning disorder as severe at the second step of the disability analysis. But the court held that any error was harmless because the administrative law judge continued through the remaining steps and considered Chao V.’s cognitive impairments in the residual-functional-capacity analysis.

The court also held that Chao V. had not adequately developed his argument that his condition met or equaled the intellectual-disorder listing. The court treated that argument as waived because he did not identify the relevant evidence or connect it to the listing’s requirements.

The court rejected Chao V.’s argument that the residual functional capacity failed to account for moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace. It explained that findings used at the third step to rate the severity of a mental impairment are not automatically part of the residual functional capacity at the fourth step. The court found that the administrative law judge’s findings at the two steps could be reconciled and that the limitation to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks was supported by the record.

The court also upheld the administrative law judge’s treatment of the medical evidence. It found adequate support for giving little weight to portions of the December 2015 evaluation, Dr. Robert C. Barron’s opinion, and questionnaires from Adeline Taylor and Lisa Johnson. The court cited inconsistencies with objective medical records, generally normal mental-status examinations, conservative treatment, daily activities, reliance on Chao V.’s subjective reports, and the limited support provided by the check-the-box questionnaires. The court further found that the administrative law judge had considered the May 2016 evaluation by Julie A. Vandermay and Monique Lowe, even though it was not discussed in detail at the fourth step, and that any failure to discuss its recommendations expressly was harmless.

The court rejected challenges to the administrative law judge’s reliance on opinions from non-examining state-agency psychological consultants. Those consultants concluded that Chao V. could understand, learn, remember, and complete routine and repetitive three-to-four-step instructions. The court found that the opinions were consistent with the clinical findings, treatment history, and daily activities, and that the administrative law judge was not required to obtain an updated opinion merely because later evidence had been added to the record.

The court also found no reversible error in the administrative law judge’s failure to expressly discuss Laurie Fang’s statement about Chao V.’s daily activities and cognitive difficulties. The court reasoned that the administrative law judge had addressed substantially similar limitations using evidence that also supported discounting Fang’s statement. Finally, because the court found that the administrative law judge properly excluded the additional limitations Chao V. proposed, it held that the hypothetical question given to the vocational expert adequately reflected the supported limitations.

Disposition

Judge Hildy Bowbeer denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The order directed that judgment be entered accordingly. The court therefore left the Commissioner’s denial of supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits in place.