Green v. Carlson

Background

Carl Green, proceeding without a lawyer, sued attorney Thomas Carlson, Chief Judge Douglas Meslow, and Judge John Hoffman. The dispute arose from state-court litigation involving a foreclosure action brought by Chamberlain Homeowners Association against Rainbow House, LLC, and PNC National Bank. The opinion states that Chamberlain obtained a judgment against Rainbow House and that the state-court matter appeared to remain pending on appeal.

Green’s July 9, 2019 amended complaint alleged that Carlson violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by attempting to collect attorney’s fees and other amounts and by communicating allegedly false information to credit-reporting agencies. Green alleged that Carlson sought more than $10,000 in attorney’s fees in connection with a judgment of $1,500 or less. Green also asserted that Judges Meslow and Hoffman deprived him of civil rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242 by refusing to remove themselves from proceedings involving a motion for relief from judgment. Against all defendants, he asserted a civil-rights conspiracy claim under 18 U.S.C. § 241 and requested preliminary injunctive relief.

Motions and analysis

Carlson moved to strike Green’s second amended complaint. The court ruled that Green had filed it without the opposing parties’ written consent or the court’s permission, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The court granted the motion to strike, making the July 9 amended complaint the operative complaint.

The defendants moved to dismiss. They argued that the court should decline to hear the case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which generally prevents lower federal courts from reviewing final state-court judgments, or under the Younger abstention doctrine, which can require federal courts to refrain from interfering with certain ongoing state proceedings. The court rejected both arguments. It concluded that the state-court foreclosure matter was not final because it was on appeal, and that the circumstances did not fit the exceptional category requiring abstention under Younger.

The court then applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to present a legally plausible claim. It held that Green’s FDCPA claim was not plausible because the asserted attorney-fee obligation was owed by Rainbow House, LLC, which is not a natural person and therefore is not a “consumer” under the FDCPA. The court also said that, even if Green claimed the fees were owed by him personally, he had not alleged that the obligation arose from a transaction involving money, property, insurance, or services primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 242 does not provide a private right of action, meaning an individual cannot use that criminal statute to bring a civil lawsuit. It further held that judicial immunity would bar Green’s claim against Judges Meslow and Hoffman because the challenged denial of a motion occurred in their judicial capacities. The court reached similar conclusions about Green’s conspiracy claim under 18 U.S.C. § 241: that statute also does not provide a private right of action, and Green’s allegations did not plausibly describe a conspiracy. Because Green had not pleaded a plausible underlying claim, the court also concluded that he could not pursue the requested accounting or preliminary injunction.

Motion to amend

Green moved for leave to file another amended complaint. The court denied that motion because amendment would be futile, meaning the proposed complaint still could not survive dismissal. The proposed FDCPA claim retained the same defect because the state-court judgment and attorney’s-fee award were alleged to have been entered against Rainbow House. The proposed claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 also lacked sufficient allegations against Carlson and continued to challenge actions taken by the judges in their judicial roles. The court additionally held that Minnesota Statute § 549.20 provides a procedure for seeking punitive damages rather than creating an independent cause of action.

Disposition

The court ordered the following:

- Carlson’s motion to strike was GRANTED, and Green’s second amended complaint was STRICKEN. - Carlson’s motion to dismiss and Judges Meslow and Hoffman’s motion to dismiss were GRANTED. - Green’s motion to amend was DENIED. - Green’s amended complaint was DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. - Judgment was ordered to be entered.