Stone v. Credit Acceptance Corporation

Background

John Stone and Lyechia Vang alleged that they purchased and possessed a 2013 Dodge Avenger from Artemis Recovery on or about March 1, 2019. They alleged that they possessed the original Minnesota title, which listed them as the vehicle’s sole owners and showed no secured interests.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants first attempted to repossess the vehicle from their residence on or about April 25, 2019. After the plaintiffs contacted the Brooklyn Police Department, the department confirmed that the plaintiffs owned the vehicle and told the defendants to leave without it. The defendants complied.

The plaintiffs further alleged that on or about May 9, 2019, Primeritus Financial Services, Inc. and 11th Hour Recovery, Inc., at Credit Acceptance Corporation’s request, repossessed the vehicle despite having no secured interest in it and despite the earlier police intervention. The plaintiffs alleged that Credit Acceptance agreed to return the vehicle on May 14, 2019. They claimed an $800 out-of-pocket loss, $486 in lost wages, and substantial inconvenience and disruption to their family dynamics and schedule.

The complaint asserted claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, trespass to chattels, wrongful repossession under Minnesota Statutes section 336.9-609, conversion, and intrusion upon seclusion. The motion addressed only the conversion claim, Count IV, and the intrusion-upon-seclusion claim, Count V. 11th Hour Recovery, Inc. was not a party to this motion.

Motion and Legal Standard

Credit Acceptance Corporation and Primeritus Financial Services, Inc. moved to dismiss Counts IV and V under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim. At this stage, the court assumed the complaint’s factual allegations were true and drew reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor. The complaint had to allege enough specific facts to make the requested relief plausible rather than merely speculative.

Count IV: Conversion

Under Minnesota law, conversion requires a willful interference with personal property, without lawful justification, that deprives a person entitled to the property of its use or possession. The interference must be permanent or last for an indefinite length of time.

The defendants argued that the conversion claim failed because the vehicle was returned after five days and because the plaintiffs had not alleged recoverable damages. The court rejected those arguments at the motion-to-dismiss stage. It held that whether five days constituted an indefinite deprivation was a factual question for a jury. The court also found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded damages, including their alleged $800 out-of-pocket loss and $486 in lost wages. It declined to dismiss Count IV.

Count V: Intrusion Upon Seclusion

Under Minnesota law, intrusion upon seclusion requires an intrusion that is highly offensive and concerns a matter in which the person has a legitimate expectation of privacy. The interference must be substantial enough that a reasonable person would strongly object.

The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had not alleged a substantial or highly offensive interference with privacy and that their allegations were conclusory. The court disagreed. It found that the allegations that the plaintiffs owned the vehicle without encumbrances, had been told by law enforcement that the defendants lacked a secured interest, and nevertheless had the vehicle repossessed two weeks later were specific enough to make the claim plausible. Whether the alleged repossession was sufficiently substantial or highly offensive was a factual question that could not properly be resolved at this stage. The court declined to dismiss Count V.

Disposition

The court denied the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts IV and V. The order did not decide the ultimate merits of those claims; it held only that the plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient for the claims to proceed.