Ann C. v. Saul
- Katherine Menendez
- 0:19-cv-00013
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 10
In Kellie Ann C. v. Saul, Judge Menendez denied Kellie Ann C.’s summary-judgment motion, granted Saul’s, and dismissed the case with prejudice.
Kellie Ann C.’s applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income remained denied; the Commissioner prevailed, and the case was dismissed with prejudice.
What happened
In Kellie Ann C. v. Andrew Saul, Kellie Ann C. challenged the denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. She argued that the administrative law judge mishandled her fibromyalgia, medical opinions, and work history.
The court agreed that the administrative law judge did not apply both required fibromyalgia evaluation methods, but found the error harmless because the record did not show the widespread pain required for either method. The court also found that the judge properly gave little weight to two medical opinions and properly considered Kellie Ann C.’s work history.
Judge Menendez denied Kellie Ann C.’s motion for summary judgment, granted the Commissioner’s motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice.
The detailed version
- Ann C. v. Saul · No. 0:19-cv-00013
- Katherine Menendez
- Jan. 10, 2020
Background
Kellie Ann C. applied for supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits. An administrative law judge issued an unfavorable decision after a hearing, finding that she had several severe impairments but could perform medium work with limitations. The judge found that she could not return to her past work but could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
Kellie Ann C. and Andrew Saul filed cross-motions for summary judgment, asking the court to decide the case based on the administrative record. Kellie Ann C. raised three challenges: that the administrative law judge used the wrong criteria to evaluate fibromyalgia; that he improperly evaluated a functional-capacity evaluation and the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Mary Sue Beran; and that he failed to properly consider her strong work history when evaluating her statements about the severity of her symptoms.
Fibromyalgia
The court agreed that the administrative law judge made an error. Social Security Ruling 12-2p provides two separate methods for deciding whether fibromyalgia is a medically determinable impairment. The first method requires, among other things, widespread pain and at least 11 positive tender points. The second method requires widespread pain, repeated manifestations of at least six fibromyalgia symptoms, signs, or related conditions, and evidence that other possible causes were excluded. The administrative law judge considered only the first method and focused on the lack of adequate tender-point examinations.
The court nevertheless held that the error was harmless, meaning it did not affect the result. The record did not support the required finding of a history of widespread pain in all four body quadrants, with axial skeletal pain lasting at least three months. The court noted that the medical and self-reported records described various localized symptoms but did not establish the required widespread pain. The court therefore concluded that the fibromyalgia claim did not meet the second method either and that no remand was required.
Medical-opinion evidence
The court upheld the administrative law judge’s decision to give little weight to the functional-capacity evaluation performed by occupational therapist Ms. Anderson. The evaluation recommended sedentary work with the ability to change positions and found that Kellie Ann C. could not crouch, crawl, or climb a step stool. The court found substantial evidence supporting the administrative law judge’s conclusion that the evaluation was inconsistent with the broader record, including examinations showing normal strength, sensation, and neurological functioning. The court also noted that the evaluation was only three hours long and that Ms. Anderson did not explain the basis for concluding that Kellie Ann C. had made maximum and consistent effort.
The court also upheld the decision to give little weight to Dr. Beran’s medical-source statement. Dr. Beran opined that Kellie Ann C.’s symptoms constantly interfered with concentration, that she could not tolerate even low-stress work, that she would need frequent breaks, and that she would miss work about three times per month. The court found that this opinion relied partly on the functional-capacity evaluation and fibromyalgia diagnosis, and that it conflicted with Dr. Beran’s own treatment notes and other evidence. The court cited records indicating that Kellie Ann C. could work seven hours per day, had worked 20 to 25 hours per week with improvement, could take a 45-minute walk, and experienced improvement with treatment and medication.
Work history and ruling
The court rejected Kellie Ann C.’s argument that the administrative law judge failed to consider her strong work history. The decision expressly recognized that she had a strong work history but concluded that objective evidence inconsistent with her allegations outweighed that history. The court found that this analysis was supported by substantial evidence.
The court ordered that Kellie Ann C.’s motion for summary judgment be DENIED, Andrew Saul’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, and the matter be dismissed with prejudice. Judge Katherine Menendez directed that judgment be entered.
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.