Upper River Services, L.L.C. v. Heiderscheid

Background

Upper River Services, L.L.C. (URS) operates an inland harbor towing service, two shipyards, and vessels that move barges on the Mississippi River. Andrew Heiderscheid was hired as a deckhand and worked exclusively in that role from November through December 2018. His duties included working aboard URS vessels and helping accomplish their towing missions.

URS closed normal operations for the winter on December 20, 2018, because ice and other winter conditions closed the Mississippi River’s locks and dams. Although the vessels remained in the water and in navigation, deckhands were typically laid off during the closure. At Heiderscheid’s request, URS permitted him to work temporarily in shoreside duties. Heiderscheid understood that the assignment was temporary and that he would return to the vessels when the locks and dams reopened. He did not complete new employment paperwork, his pay did not change, and he remained available to work aboard a vessel if an emergency arose.

Heiderscheid worked shoreside for ten days and alleged that he was injured on January 21, 2019, while picking up and throwing a piece of metal. URS later terminated him. URS reported that Heiderscheid worked 402.75 total hours for the company, including 236 hours—or 59%—aboard URS vessels in navigation.

URS filed this case seeking a declaration that Heiderscheid was a seaman governed by federal maritime law rather than state law, and that URS had no obligation to pay him maintenance and cure. Heiderscheid denied that he was a seaman when injured and argued that he was then a land-based laborer in URS’s maintenance department. He also asserted alternative claims under the Jones Act and general maritime law if the court determined that he was a seaman. A Minnesota workers’ compensation judge had dismissed Heiderscheid’s workers’ compensation claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, without deciding whether he was a seaman.

Summary-judgment standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court concluded that the material facts concerning Heiderscheid’s work and temporary shoreside assignment were undisputed, allowing the court to decide seaman status as a legal matter.

Seaman status during normal operations

The court explained that the Jones Act provides a negligence claim for a seaman injured during employment. The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act generally covers land-based maritime workers but excludes a master or member of a vessel’s crew. These laws create separate compensation systems for seamen and land-based maritime workers.

Under the Supreme Court’s two-part test, an employee’s duties must contribute to a vessel’s function or mission, and the employee must have a connection to a vessel in navigation—or an identifiable group of vessels—that is substantial in both duration and nature. The court also noted the general rule of thumb that a worker spending less than about 30% of work time serving a vessel in navigation ordinarily should not qualify as a seaman.

The court held that Heiderscheid clearly satisfied this test during URS’s normal operating season. He worked aboard at least four URS vessels and spent nearly all of his time helping tow barges. His work therefore contributed to the vessels’ functions and missions, and he had a substantial connection to the vessels in navigation.

Effect of the temporary shoreside assignment

The court recognized that a worker’s seaman status can change when a basic work assignment changes and the worker’s essential duties are substantially altered. But it rejected Heiderscheid’s argument that status should be determined solely by examining the shoreside work he was doing when injured.

The court found that the shoreside assignment did not fundamentally change Heiderscheid’s employment. The assignment was temporary, arose from URS’s seasonal shutdown, and was undertaken so he could continue working during what would normally have been a period of unemployment. He was expected to return to the vessels when operations resumed; his pay and employment paperwork did not change; URS’s vessels remained in navigation; and he remained subject to the vessels’ call.

The court also distinguished an earlier Supreme Court decision involving a worker assigned to seasonal repairs while the employer’s boats were out of the water and without captains or crews. Unlike that situation, Heiderscheid remained employed throughout the winter, URS’s vessels stayed in the water and in navigation, and he could have been called to crew them.

Because the temporary shoreside work did not alter the fundamental nature of Heiderscheid’s employment or his connection to URS’s vessels, the court evaluated his status based on his entire period of employment. His 59% vessel-service percentage also exceeded the Supreme Court’s general 30% guideline.

Disposition

The court held that Heiderscheid remained a seaman under the Jones Act at the time of his alleged injury. It GRANTED URS’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and DENIED Heiderscheid’s Motion for Summary Judgment.