In re: Polaris Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability Litigation

Background

Fourteen plaintiffs from 13 states alleged that Polaris Industries, Inc. and Polaris Sales Inc. manufactured off-road vehicles with an excessive-heat design defect involving their ProStar engines. The plaintiffs alleged that the defect caused more than 250 fires, more than 30 severe injuries, and at least three deaths. Seven plaintiffs alleged that their vehicles caught fire and were completely lost; the court called them the “Fire Plaintiffs.” The remaining plaintiffs did not allege that their vehicles caught fire or malfunctioned; the court called them the “No-Fire Plaintiffs.”

The plaintiffs asserted state-law claims involving consumer fraud, express and implied warranties, fraudulent omission, and unjust enrichment, along with a claim under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. They sought injunctive and monetary relief but expressly did not seek damages for personal injuries. Defendants moved to dismiss all claims except specified claims brought by Luna, Halvorsrod, Rogers, Turgeon, and Guthrie.

Standing

The court held that Bruner, Lenz, Zeeck, Berens, Jacks, Forrest, and Beattie had not alleged a concrete, individualized injury. Those plaintiffs alleged that their vehicles came from a product line with the excessive-heat defect, but they did not allege facts showing how the defect manifested in their particular vehicles. The court concluded that the allegations that the vehicles generated high or excessive heat did not, by themselves, establish an injury in fact.

The court therefore dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction Count 1 as to the No-Fire Plaintiffs; Counts 2 through 6 as to Bruner; Counts 17 through 25 as to Lenz and Zeeck; Counts 37 through 46 as to Berens and Jacks; Counts 57 through 61 as to Forrest; and Counts 62 through 65 as to Beattie. The court noted that Rodriguez’s standing was undisputed because his vehicle was completely lost after catching fire.

Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests whether the complaint alleges enough facts to present a plausible claim for relief. Applying that standard, the court ruled as follows:

- Warranty and Magnuson-Moss claims: The court dismissed without prejudice the warranty claims of Halvorsrod, Rogers, Elkin, Turgeon, and Rodriguez because the complaint did not allege that they gave the pre-suit notice required by the applicable state laws. Their related Magnuson-Moss claims were also dismissed without prejudice because those claims depended on an underlying state-law warranty claim. - Guthrie’s Louisiana claims: Guthrie’s express-warranty claim was dismissed without prejudice because the complaint did not allege that he requested repair or replacement under Polaris’s limited warranty or that Polaris refused such a request. His implied-warranty, unjust-enrichment, fraudulent-omission, and consumer-fraud claims were dismissed with prejudice because the Louisiana Products Liability Act provides the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products. His related Magnuson-Moss claim was dismissed without prejudice. - Unjust enrichment: The court granted the motion as to the unjust-enrichment claims of Halvorsrod and Rogers and dismissed those claims with prejudice because they had already had an opportunity to correct the pleading defect. The court denied the motion as to the unjust-enrichment claims of Elkin and Rodriguez, concluding that the court had found no Pennsylvania or Texas legal requirement that a benefit be directly conferred on the defendants. - Fraud claims: The court dismissed with prejudice Elkin’s and Rodriguez’s fraud claims because the economic-loss rule barred tort recovery for their alleged purely economic losses. The court dismissed without prejudice Turgeon’s fraudulent-omission claim because the complaint did not allege a duty to disclose under South Dakota law. The court dismissed without prejudice Luna’s fraud claims because the complaint did not identify an actionable statement or omission attributable to the defendants with the required particularity. The fraudulent-omission claims of Halvorsrod and Rogers had previously been dismissed with prejudice and were included in the amended complaint only to preserve them for appeal.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss. It dismissed with prejudice Counts 15, 16, 27, 29 through 31, 35, 36, 47, 50, Count 57 as asserted by Isaac Rodriguez, and Count 60 as asserted by Isaac Rodriguez. It dismissed without prejudice Count 1 as asserted by all plaintiffs except Luna; Counts 2 through 7, 10, and 12; Counts 14, 17 through 25, 28, 33, 34, 37 through 46, 48, 49, and 53 through 55; Counts 57 through 61 as asserted by Bryan Forrest; Counts 58 and 59 as asserted by Isaac Rodriguez; and Counts 62 through 65. Judge Wilhelmina M. Wright signed the order.