Mark S. v. Saul

Background

Mark S. sought review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying his application for supplemental security income. He did not challenge the denial of his separate application for disability insurance benefits. The administrative law judge found that Mark S. had multiple severe physical and mental impairments but determined that they did not meet or equal a listed impairment.

The administrative law judge assessed Mark S.’s residual functional capacity, meaning the most he could do in a work setting despite his limitations. The judge found that Mark S. could perform medium work with restrictions, including limits on climbing, exposure to hazards and irritants, handling and fingering, and interactions with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. Although Mark S. could not return to his past work as a forklift driver, the judge found that he could perform other unskilled jobs, including assembler and package sealer machine tender. The Appeals Council declined review, making the administrative law judge’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision.

Arguments and Analysis

Mark S. argued that the administrative law judge improperly assessed his residual functional capacity at the fourth step of the disability analysis. He challenged the weight given to Karen Leaman’s opinion, the treatment of consultative psychologist Craig Barron’s opinion, the assessment of his physical impairments, and the failure to discuss his work history when evaluating his reported symptoms.

The court applied the substantial-evidence standard. Under that standard, the court had to determine whether enough evidence supported the Commissioner’s decision, including evidence that detracted from it. The court could not reverse merely because the evidence could also support a different result.

The court upheld the decision to give little weight to Leaman’s October 2017 opinion. Leaman, a certified nurse practitioner, opined that Mark S. could not sustain competitive employment and had numerous marked and extreme limitations. The court explained that, because Mark S.’s claim was filed before March 27, 2017, Leaman was not an “acceptable medical source” under the applicable regulations, so her opinion was not treated as a treating-source medical opinion entitled to special weight. The court also found that her treatment notes, other providers’ records, improvement with medication, and relatively conservative treatment were inconsistent with the extreme limitations in her written opinion.

The court also rejected Mark S.’s challenge to the treatment of Barron’s opinion. Barron concluded that Mark S. could understand and perform simple work and should have only brief, infrequent, and superficial interactions with coworkers and supervisors. The administrative law judge gave the opinion substantial weight but limited Mark S. to occasional interactions rather than adopting every proposed restriction. The court held that an administrative law judge need not adopt every limitation in a medical opinion and that the record supported the interaction limits used in the residual functional capacity assessment.

Regarding physical impairments, the court found substantial evidence supporting the finding that Mark S. could perform medium work with additional restrictions. The record included generally normal respiratory testing and examinations, symptom relief from inhalers, limited objective findings concerning pain and joint problems, and conservative treatment. The court concluded that the administrative law judge properly considered the entire record rather than relying on one medical opinion.

Finally, the court rejected the argument that the administrative law judge reversibly erred by not mentioning Mark S.’s work history. The judge discussed other factors relevant to evaluating reported symptoms, including inconsistencies with the medical evidence, daily activities, and the effectiveness of medication. The court held that the judge was not required to discuss every factor expressly.

Disposition

The court concluded that the administrative law judge did not err in finding that Mark S. could perform medium work and properly evaluated the conflicting evidence and reported symptoms. Judge Hildy Bowbeer denied Mark S.’s motion for summary judgment and granted Andrew Saul’s motion for summary judgment. The order directed that judgment be entered accordingly.