Fredin v. Street
- Susan Nelson
- 0:19-cv-02864
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 9
Fredin v. Street: Judge Nelson denied Fredin’s motion to file a second amended complaint because the proposed claims were futile.
Brock Fredin’s request to amend his complaint was denied; the proposed claims against Lindsey Middlecamp, James Street, and Patrick C. Diamond could not be added in the proposed amendment.
What happened
In Fredin v. Street, Brock Fredin, representing himself, sued James Street, Patrick C. Diamond, and Lindsey Middlecamp under a federal civil-rights law, challenging a harassment restraining order and related actions.
Fredin asked to add allegations that he sought future relief. The defendants opposed the amendment, arguing that the claims were legally insufficient, that Middlecamp was a private citizen, and that Street and Diamond were protected by judicial immunity.
Judge Susan Richard Nelson denied the motion. She ruled that the claims against Middlecamp could not proceed under the civil-rights law because the complaint did not show that she acted for the state, and that judicial immunity protected Street and Diamond because Fredin challenged past judicial actions rather than seeking future relief.
The detailed version
- Fredin v. Street · No. 0:19-cv-02864
- Susan Nelson
- Mar. 17, 2020
Background
Brock Fredin filed this federal civil-rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Lindsey Middlecamp, James Street, and Patrick C. Diamond. Fredin challenged a harassment restraining order issued by the Ramsey County District Court and sought declaratory and injunctive relief based on alleged violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Middlecamp had obtained the restraining order. Street was the state-court judicial referee presiding over the related state-court action, and Diamond was the Ramsey County District Judge who issued the order. The order restricted Fredin’s contact with Middlecamp, certain online communications, disclosure of Middlecamp’s identifying information, and the filing of new litigation against her without prior permission.
Fredin moved for leave to file a second amended complaint. The court explained that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to amend may be denied when the proposed amendment would be futile. An amendment is futile when the proposed complaint could not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Claims Against Middlecamp
Middlecamp argued, among other things, that Fredin’s proposed claims were legally insufficient because she was a private citizen rather than a state actor. To state a § 1983 claim, the challenged conduct must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law, meaning through authority or conduct fairly attributable to the state.
The court found that Fredin’s allegations that the defendants acted under color of state law were conclusory. The complaint described Middlecamp as a private citizen who brought the state-court proceeding. The court held that her success in obtaining the restraining order did not establish the kind of state action required for § 1983 liability. Because the proposed claims against Middlecamp would be futile, the court denied Fredin’s motion to amend as to those claims.
Claims Against Street and Diamond
Street and Diamond argued that judicial immunity barred the proposed claims. Judicial immunity generally protects judges and judicial officers from suits based on actions taken in their judicial capacities. Fredin argued that the protection did not apply because he sought prospective declaratory relief—relief concerning future conduct.
The court concluded that Fredin was actually seeking a declaration that the July 26, 2019 restraining order and the State Judicial Defendants’ past actions violated his constitutional rights. Referring to the narrow exception for prospective declaratory relief, the court held that the exception did not apply because Fredin challenged past judicial actions rather than genuinely seeking prospective relief. The court therefore found that Street and Diamond were entitled to judicial immunity and that the proposed amendments against them would also be futile.
Disposition
The court stated that Fredin was precluded from making all of his proposed amendments. It ordered that Fredin’s Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint was DENIED.
The opinion also mentions earlier recommendations concerning other motions, but this order’s express disposition is the denial of Fredin’s motion to amend.
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.