Fredin v. Street

Background

Brock Fredin sued James Street, Patrick C. Diamond, and Lindsey Middlecamp under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. This report and recommendation addressed only Fredin’s second motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction as to Middlecamp. The court had already recommended denying the requested injunction as to Street and Diamond, and the District Court had adopted that recommendation.

Fredin’s claims principally concerned a 50-year harassment restraining order issued by state-court Judge Patrick C. Diamond on July 26, 2019, on Middlecamp’s petition. The order barred Fredin from starting new cases against Middlecamp as a self-represented party without prior judicial permission and from anonymously publishing or contributing to websites or creating online content about Middlecamp. Fredin sought an injunction stopping enforcement of that order and stopping a final-order hearing in the related state-court proceeding.

Analysis

A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order depends on four factors: the likelihood that the requesting party will succeed on the merits, the threat of irreparable harm, the balance of harms, and the public interest. The requesting party bears the burden of establishing that emergency relief is appropriate.

Middlecamp argued that Fredin could not prevail under § 1983 because that law applies to government action, while she was sued in her personal capacity for actions taken as a private citizen. The court agreed that the allegations and filings showed Middlecamp was being sued as a private party rather than as a state actor.

The court also considered the possibility that Fredin’s theory was that Middlecamp had deliberately participated in joint activity with Judge Diamond and Referee Street. A private person who deliberately joins in joint activity with the state or its agents can be treated as a state actor for § 1983 purposes. Fredin, however, did not provide proof that Middlecamp had deliberately participated in joint state activity. The court therefore found that he had not established a likelihood of success on the merits.

Because Fredin failed to show likely success, the court stopped its analysis and did not address the remaining injunction factors. It also did not decide Middlecamp’s argument that the federal Anti-Injunction Act barred the requested relief.

Recommendation and procedural status

Magistrate Judge Hildy Bowbeer recommended that Fredin’s second motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction be DENIED as to Lindsey Middlecamp. The document was a report and recommendation, not a District Court order or judgment, and the notice explained that it was not directly appealable to the Eighth Circuit. The notice allowed the parties to file specific written objections within the stated period. The supplied case metadata identifies District Judge Susan Richard Nelson; the recommendation itself was signed by Magistrate Judge Hildy Bowbeer.