Laughlin v. Stuart

Background

The court considered three motions: Michael B. Hari’s motion to compel discovery, the defendant’s motion to extend the time to accept a response, and the plaintiffs’ motion for permission to amend their civil-rights complaint. The plaintiffs were unrepresented individuals in custody.

Hari served discovery requests on James Stuart in January 2020. After receiving no response, Hari resubmitted the requests and sent meet-and-confer letters. He filed the motion to compel on April 1, 2020. Stuart later responded and asked for an extension, arguing that the motion to compel was premature.

The plaintiffs also sought to add more than a dozen defendants and numerous constitutional and wiretap claims. The proposed claims included claims under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Federal Wiretap Act, and the Minnesota Wiretap Act. The opinion states that the constitutional claims against state and county officials were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, while claims against federal officials were brought under the doctrine commonly known as Bivens.

Motion to Amend

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 generally allows amendment with the court’s permission after the time for amendment as of right has passed. The court explained that permission may be denied for reasons such as undue delay, prejudice, or futility. An amendment is futile if the proposed pleading could not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a legally sufficient claim.

The defendants did not oppose adding Laughlin’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Wood and Evans, Lewis’s Sixth Amendment claim against Tessa Villergas, or certain supporting factual allegations. The court granted permission to add those unopposed matters. Out of caution, it also permitted Lewis to assert First and Sixth Amendment claims against James Stuart and Villergas.

The court denied permission to add Hari’s new claims. Those claims concerned alleged collection or review of privileged calls, computer monitoring, legal mail, cell searches, and reading of legal materials at different facilities. The court concluded that these claims were unrelated to the claims in the original complaint, which concerned conditions and events at the Anoka County Jail. The court stated that Hari could raise those claims in a separate lawsuit.

The court also denied permission to add Lewis’s proposed First Amendment retaliation claim against Wood and Evans because the proposed complaint did not plausibly connect the supporting allegations to Lewis. It denied the proposed claims against Zerwas because the complaint did not allege that Zerwas reviewed Hari’s legal mail or otherwise violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. It denied Lewis’s proposed First and Sixth Amendment claims against Brott because the complaint did not identify specific actions by Brott that interfered with Lewis’s attorney communications. The court also found that the complaint did not identify an unconstitutional policy or custom supporting an official-capacity claim against Brott.

The court summarized the result as granting in part and denying in part the motion for permission to amend. The plaintiffs could add, under § 1983, Laughlin’s First Amendment claims against Wood and Evans and Lewis’s First and Sixth Amendment claims against Stuart and Villergas. The motion was denied in all other respects.

Motion to Compel

The court held that the usual rule delaying discovery until the parties’ initial planning conference did not apply because this case was exempt from initial disclosure requirements. Hari therefore was not barred from serving discovery before a pretrial scheduling order.

Stuart conceded that he had not responded to Hari’s requests. The court explained that document requests generally require a written response within 30 days and that failing to object timely can waive objections. Stuart’s belief that the plaintiffs might amend their complaint, the absence of a pretrial scheduling order, and the lack of a hearing date did not provide good cause for ignoring the requests. The court also stated that Hari was not required to obtain a briefing schedule before filing this non-dispositive motion.

The court granted Hari’s motion to compel and ordered Stuart to respond fully to the discovery requests within 30 days of the order’s filing, consistent with the protective order already issued in the case.

Disposition

The court granted the defendant’s motion to extend the time for accepting the response. It granted Hari’s motion to compel. It granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion for permission to amend, allowing the specified claims and denying the motion in all other respects. The order also stated that prior consistent orders remained in force and described possible remedies for noncompliance, including sanctions and other forms of relief.